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ABSTRACT
The majority of households, more so urban households in developing countries, do not normally have access to
mortgage finance. The consequence is a lower level investment in housing, resulting in overcrowding, lower
quality housing, and a proliferation of squatter communities. For high inflation economies in particular,
households are faced with incomes that are not rising as fast, so that, over time, the number of persons able to
invest in the housing market decreases. These conditions characterize, to a large extent, the housing situation
in Jamaica.
The National Housing Trust, established in 1976 and modeled after the Brazil Housing Bank, was an
attempt by the State at finding solutions to these problems. The essence of the NHT program is its pool of
funds from compulsory contributions and its mortgage credit system. The thrust of the program was to
target mortgage lending to its contributor in a socially progressive manner. Low-income contributors would
be given priority, but loans would be apportioned equitably among all contributors. The allocation criteria
were designed so that all income groups contributing to the Trust would have approximately the same
proportion of mortgages.
This thesis evaluated the housing finance system in Jamaica and its implications for low-income individuals.
Special attention was given to the poor working class and the extent to which they benefited under the NHT
housing program. The intention was to evaluate the distribution of total subsidy among the various income
groups of NHT's mortgagors. It was necessary also to evaluate how NHT's activities were influenced by
macro-economic and government policies.
The main conclusion of the study is that the NHT is a financially sound institution. Nevertheless, it has
fallen short of its stated goal of serving its low-income contributors. The evaluation revealed that under the
NHT mortgage credit system the distribution of mortgagors by income group bore no resemblance to the
distribution of contributors by income groups. In other words, the higher income contributors received
more than their proportionate share of the housing benefits. Overall, interest subsidies among mortgagors
were substantial, but are not used to cross-subsidies smaller loans or lower income groups. But whereas the
data presented a checkered record for the 1980's, data for the 1990's suggest an improved climate for
mortgage lending for low-income contributors. These data should be interpreted with caution, since they do
not account for internal inaccuracies such as data entry errors and incomplete entries. Given this, the
challenge remains for the provision of a housing finance system that is viable for the lower-income
contributors. Recommendations for internal or institutional reform are outlined.
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PART A: AN OVERVIEW
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 National Housing Finance Institutions in Developing Countries: A Review
of Problems and Practices in the Housing of Low-Income Households
In the summer of 1995, the National Housing Trust (NHT) accepted applications for 1000
studio units. These units were specifically targeted to lower-income applicants. The
price of each unit was approximately J$450,000, and the qualifying income was J$1,200
per week. Fifteen thousand persons applied for these units, with less than half, about
40% being low-income applicants - those earning J$2,000 and less weekly.' This
incongruence between demand and supply simply means that not all applicants will be
successful, and usually it is the lower-income applicants that are the unlucky ones. At the
end of the process the majority of the low-income applicants 'dropped out of the race'.
Less than 15% of these applicants were successful mortgagors.
This scenario describes very well what the housing situation has been in Jamaica for a
long time now. First, there is always a shortfall in the supply of affordable solutions,
particularly, complete units. Second, the disenfranchised group is usually the low-income
persons. The National Housing Trust, one of the main providers of housing for the
working class, has been battling for years with the problem of meeting the housing needs
of all its contributors, particularly the low-income ones. The records show that the lowest
income group of its target population, those earning equal to or less than J$ 1,100, weekly,
have hardly been benefiting over the years.
As part of this chapter, I surveyed of the relevant literature on national housing finance
institutions in developing countries, to derive some possible explanations for their
failures and successes. I used the experiences of the NHT and the Brazilian National
See appendix 3 for the distribution of applicants by income groups.
Housing Bank (BNH) to try and discern, within the context of each country, the factors
that prevent these finance institutions from adequately meeting their mandate. As a
prelude to the exploration of the literature, I attempt a generalized definition of the
housing finance predicament of the low-income persons. I then appraise the practices and
characteristics of both the formal and informal sectors, borrowing from the experiences of
developed countries, matching these with what the literature considers to be requisites of
an efficient housing finance system. Part of my interest too is to understand why the
development of seemingly viable institutions, such as those in the developing countries,
lag behind their developed country counterparts, and particularly why they fail in meeting
the needs of their low-income clientele. The final section of the review looks at some of
the suggested strategies housing finance institutions may employ to facilitate housing
solutions for their low-income clientele.
Perhaps a good starting point to this chapter is understanding the housing finance
problem - its perceived dimensions, and its clientele of low-income persons. The
definition of the problem2 as a starting point is important for two reasons, first it provides
some context for ensuing arguments and discussions, and second, in many cases the
nature of solution that is prescribed, depends to a large extent on how the problem has
been defined 3 . The whole idea is to demonstrate that if the problem is narrowly defined
in the first instance, then there is the danger that the solutions may also be narrowly
defined. But, as the a review of the literature will demonstrate, defining the problem or its
solution(s) is not a straightforward task.
Housing is defined in this context as a unit of dwelling space and amenities that provides
the occupants with the necessities of healthy living (UNCHS, Habitat 1991). In
developing countries, almost every household is housed in a dwelling, but not every
2 The group that derives the greatest benefit from improved housing is the group that gets to define the problem by its own standards.
Politicians may be the greatest benefactors. They view housing programs as being very attractive, partly because the end product is
very visible, signaling an image of progress. Politicians feel that if individuals are given a stake in their economic development,
they may be more willing to exercise their franchise. Economic power and importance attained through the new housing,
particularly if it is owned, may very well act as a panacea for the poor and engender political stability.
3 In Jamaica For the low-income household, the problem is defined as one of affordability, hence the solution was the use of
mortgage credit subsidy, below market interest rates. See Paul Chen Young, 1976, A study of Housing in Jamaica, vls. 1, 2.
dwelling is considered a healthy living space. If housing is defined in this manner, then
the first problem of housing is understood as one of providing people with suitable
housing services . The provision of suitable housing services requires adequate financial
resources to cover the cost of the necessary land, material, and human resources for the
construction of these services - financial resources that far exceed that of the low-income
individual or household. The shortage of adequate housing, therefore, hits the poor the
hardest, indicating a lack of finance.
Affordability is, therefore, a major aspect of the problem. In market economies for
example, there are some instances where the poor are called upon to pay in relation to
their income high prices for housing, even prices higher than those charged to higher
income groups for similar products. This is due in part to the fact that capital for low-
income housing demands a higher price than capital for higher-income housing.
Households, or individuals whose incomes cannot accommodate the monthly payments to
defray the costs of their housing needs are referred to as low-income individuals or
households. Low-income households have limited access to the formal market for
4
financing their housing. Their source of finance is from friends, family, and savings.
With limited finance, they have access to what the formal sector describes as slum
dwellings. A perceived solution to this 'dilemma', is that a strategy must be devised to
get these households into reasonably priced housing that characterizes healthy living. In
order to accommodate the transition of these households, their income must be
augmented, either through gifts or by government subsidies. The issue of what housing
finance strategies should be put in place to facilitate this transition, is the focus of this
chapter.
The Practices
In most developing countries, the need to channel 'adequate and reliable' resources for
the construction sector to meet the demand for housing, is usually the premise on which
4 In Jamaica, a very important informal source of finance is the Partner system - a saving s and loan arrangement among individuals.
most national housing finance institutions are created. For example, in 1976, a study
conducted by the Jamaican government, emphasized that if the country was ever to meet
its housing needs, an adequate and reliable source of funds was needed for the housing
(construction) sector, (Paul Chen-Young and Associates, 1976). The National Housing
Trust was established as the institution that would solve the problem of the lack of funds,
and that of the inequitable distribution of existing funds. Besides stimulating the housing
sector, the other important task of the Trust was to provide housing for the country's
working poor. The NHT's counterpart, the BNH was founded on a similar premise. The
BNH of Brazil "was created with the authority to guide, discipline and control the
Housing Finance System, and to promote the construction and acquisition of houses,
especially by lower income groups" (Vliet, 1994).
The NHT and the BNH typify most national housing finance institutions in developing
countries. These institutions are created and basically maintained by the government.
According to Malpezzi (1994), this fact forms the basis of the problems of these
institutions. Governmental policies constrain the efficient functioning of these
institutions; in many cases, the functions, policies and objectives of the institution cannot
be distinguished from that of the government. But this is just one argument offered to
help explain the failures of these institutions. Other explanations include: market
imperfections such as the macro-economic/financial constraints (Renaud, 1987, 1984;
Okpala, 1994); institutional constraints Grimes, 1976); inappropriate housing policy and
regulatory framework (Renaud, 1987, 1984; Fass 1987; Lim, 1987); as well as socio-
political factors (Klak, 1995).
5 The premise was that the economy could indeed be stimulated through publicly-financed housing construction as this activity could
likely stimulate indirectly, employment and the materials industry.
Attempted Explanations of the Failures:
Failures Linked to Government Regulatory and Macro-Economic Policies
It has been established that, the better the housing finance system performs, relative to
incomes, the lower housing prices will be (Malpezzi, pg. 993). But few developing
countries have demonstrated that government interventions in the housing sector (as a
provider of the product rather than a facilitator) achieve. Criticisms levied against
governments are that their policies constrain the efficient functioning of national housing
institutions, severely limiting their autonomy. Their operations and institutional structure
are influenced by government policies, and if their funds are sponsored by the government,
their resources are often not sufficient to keep them on a sustainable path (Okpala, 1994). In
some countries, examples of constraining policies are, regulated lending rates, and
restriction on how the housing budget of these institutions is deployed. Experiences in
Jamaica and Brazil, show that these institutions have little control too over their housing
resources. The NHT, for example, is required to invest some of its funds into government
securities. This significantly restricts the amount of funds that can be invested in housing.
In the case of Brazil, loans of large sums are given to the government to finance jumbo
projects (Shidlo,1990). With lending rates, regulated below market rates under an
inflationary environment are highly negative in real terms.
The development of any well-functioning housing finance system is strongly linked to the
level of sophistication of the country's financial system. This in turn is linked to the
overall economy (Malpezzi, 1990; Renaud, 1987, 1984, Boleat, 1985; Lim 1987). As
such, appropriate monetary policies play an important role in the availability of housing
finance. Inappropriate interest rate structures among housing finance institutions, can
create distortions in the housing finance market. Klak and Peterson (1990), suggest that
an appropriate housing finance policy is one in which:
- "Credit terms for shelter development should be consistent with the terms of
credit extended to other sectors of the economy. In absence of special justification
for sectoral treatment, there is the presumption in favor of uniform interest rates
throughout the economy;
- public credit institution should not undercut the interest rate structure of
the rest of shelter sector, particularly those of the private institutions in the
sector. Below market credit terms, offered by one institution is likely to not
expand the credit availability to the shelter sector'.
Inappropriately conceived economic policies too can worsen the housing problems.
Rakoodi's (1995 ) work in Zimbabwe lends support to this claim. For instance, the
differential treatment of Post Office Savings Banks (PSOBs), have put them in a greater
financial position than their only competitors, Building Societies during the inflationary
period of the 1980's. The non-taxing of interest on POSBs accounts, have enabled them
to increase their share of total savings over that of the building societies. The country's
implemented structural adjustment measures, including trade and financial liberalization
of the beginning of the 1990's had a negative impact on the activities of the housing
sector. These measures led to rapid increases in interest rates, and a fall off in savings.
The resulting increased economic instability inevitably threatened other policies designed
to improve the activities of the housing sector such as the increased use of private sector
housing finance to extend home ownership to low-income persons.
Economic destabilizers, such as chronic inflation do not produce conducive environments
for a well-functioning finance institution. However, some corrective measures can be a
source of handicap to the housing finance system. Generally structural adjustment
policies are designed to avoid the collapse of the national economy, and require rigorous
almost continuous and severe credit rationing and social spending (Grimes, 1976).
During economic crisis of the 1980s, NHT was regulated to limit its housing budget .
This was all part of the government's fiscal measures to mop-up excess liquidity in the
economy to reduce inflation. These measures, however, have undoubtedly reduced the
amount of funds available for housing finance.
Failures Linked to Weak Institutional Relationships
Weak institutional relationships between different agencies involved in the finance of
housing not only makes it difficult to integrate the housing finance system within the
wider financial system, but also makes the negative effects of some inappropriate
government policies even greater. In turn, some government policies seem to also
perpetuate the weaknesses. In Jamaica, for example, housing finance is channeled
through various institutions, a system that lacks a definite coordinated approach.
According to Malpezzi (1990), the lack of a coordinated approach prevents the most
efficient utilization of limited funds available for investment in housing. Such
inefficiency is reflected in the co-existence of excess liquidity in some financial
institutions, and the severe shortage of investment funds in other areas of the housing
market.
According to Malpezzi (1990), other institutional weaknesses may stem from within the
institutions themselves. He maintains, for instance, that housing finance institutions need
to consider also, their mortgage packages. How best to manipulate these packages to suit
their clientele; and how to measure the impacts of these instruments on their profitability .
The Graduated Payment mortgage method makes mortgage more affordable for low-
income persons, but negatively impacts the profitability of the institutions because of the
longer time it takes to repay the principal. This is even a greater problem in inflationary
economies. As a result of inflation, therefore, some oppose long-term mortgage payment
method even when these are more appropriate for low income persons.
Grimes (1976) in his contribution considers mismanagement and the lack of effective
administration as institutional weaknesses that contribute the inefficiency of finance
institutions. According to Okpala (1994, pg. 1581), the problem of "the lack of
competent management is yet all too common and pervasive in national housing finance
institutions" as in most other government institutions in developing countries. The NHT,
for example, is criticized for its bureaucratic administration that is said is far removed
from its clientele. Findings of a recent study done on the NHT, indicated that, reduction
in the bureaucratic nature of its administration would lead to considerable savings in
personnel costs (Altman, Mende, Uecker, 1993). Inefficiency in administration and
mismanagement in external agencies, for example, the Land Valuation Department,
which housing finance institutions must work with also constrain performance. The
cumbersome system of the land administration, particularly the land titling processes,
slows loan processing significantly. The success of the NHT's Build-On-Own-Land and
Home Improvement loan programs, have been limited by the lack of proper titling of land
in rural Jamaica - the areas in which these loan programs would be best suited.6
Though it is a fact that the problem of housing finance, particularly for low-income
individuals, is a multi-faceted one (the mistargeting of subsidies, the use of inappropriate
building and architectural standards, inaccurate/inappropriate accounting of financial
flows etc.), Grimes (1976) suggested that, the real problem may be due to the enormity of
the task of providing housing for low-income persons . As such, even if conducive
financial and economic environments were created to support an efficient housing finance
system, the available resources may be only marginally adequate to make a significant
impact on the housing situation. The sentiments expressed by Grimes are that 'the
development of housing for all low-income households in developing countries is such a
gigantic enterprise that it would use up all available national resources.'
Failures linked to Socio-Political Factors
Thomas Klak (1992) considers the aforementioned explanations lacking an appreciation
of 'more fundamental state characteristics that produce and maintain such housing
structures.' He centers his criticism of housing finance programs in developing countries
around the 'workings of the state'. Klak shows that state housing programs that are to a
large extent shaped by the structure of a country's political economy or dependence. He
maintains, therefore, that a state centered-approach provides a deeper understanding of
6 Harris Walder, Cheryll, 1992. " The NHT Build-Own-Land Program".
the problems inherent in these institutions and their programs, and can indirectly provide
better answers to broader policy-oriented questions such as: why low-income households
are so poorly understood? How is the form of housing assistance determined? Why does
the state build housing with high standards?
Many of Klak's arguments are based on work done in Ecuador, Jamaica and Brazil. He
shows that though these countries are different in certain respects, they share some
common 'successes' and 'failures' in their housing programs. Klak shows how effective
cross-regional, comparative analyses can be in understanding the workings of
contemporary housing programs of similar makings. With this method of analysis, he
demonstrates that weaknesses of housing programs in these countries can be traced "to a
history of 'dependency capitalism'. This is a system of skewed distribution of power and
privilege, and therefore, a system that is inherently incapable of meeting the basic needs
of its working class". His characterization of economies with dependent capitalism helps
to identify the possible causes of failures of the housing institutions mandates. Such
economies, he says:
- are weak in terms of internal dynamics of capital accumulation;
- do not possess strong internal multipliers;
- do not effectively circulate social surplus in the domestic sphere;
- and have skewed income distribution;
These conditions, he maintains, make it impossible for governments to satisfy the
"material needs of the citizenry, particularly housing for the working class." The demand
for housing will not be provided by the private sector because of its unprofitability. The
state, therefore, steps in to try to correct the situation, but it must also accommodate the
wishes of the private sector, even at the expense of providing housing for the needy.
This described by Klak, to a certain extent illustrates the environment in which the
Jamaica's National Housing Trust operates. It is a situation in which the social objective
of channeling housing to those of the greatest need has almost been abandoned. Grimes
(page 89-90), says that as long that there is an unserviced demand for housing among the
higher-income groups, houses intended for low-income individuals will be diverted to
this group. Klak extends this argument by maintaining that the socio-political
environment engenders such 'inefficiencies'. He says that as long as the economic
environment continues to be one of dependency, "these socially progressive institutions
necessary to meet the needs of the low-income clientele will continue to dwindle." ( Klak,
1995). But the question is, despite these failures and inefficiencies, how do these finance
institutions still able to legitimate their existence. This is not a difficult question to
answer since the 'disenfranchised' are not those with the power to influence change;
those with the power benefit from maintaining the status quo.
1.1.1 The Research Problem
The review of the literature has revealed that the failure of national housing finance
institutions in meeting their mandates of providing housing for their low-income clientele
must be attributed to a variety of factors. I will therefore, used the explanations provided
by the literature as a starting point to evaluate the success of the NHT's mortgage credit
subsidy program.
One of the main objectives of the NHT is to "add to and to improve the existing housing in
Jamaica 7 whereby initially, low-income contributors are to be given priority consideration."
The expansion of the housing stock was to be achieved through direct construction of units
and the provision of below-market loans to its contributors, for not only purchasing new
units, but also to improve existing ones. To encourage and promote improved methods of
housing production, and to increase the overall capability of the sector, NHT's role also to
included the provision of technical training and research. However, this thesis will focus
primarily on the social mandate of the Trust - that of providing working class housing.
7 The 1976 NHT Act
The Trust targets its contributors with below-market mortgage credit subsidies. Mortgage
rates are tied to specific income bands, and lower rates are to be charged with low incomes.
To maintain the Trust's progressive objective, allocation criteria disregarded market rules,
example loan to value ratio, and were designed such that housing assistance would be
divided equitably among each income group. Awards of benefits were, therefore, weighted
on a priority basis between the different income groups.
In practice, an increasing number of middle- and higher-income groups is those granted
loans.8 The major target group of low-income and the self-employed contributors' level
of participation in the program is low. The question, therefore, is why is this so? But
the more important policy question, given the design of the Trust's housing program, is
whether the Trust can really target its low-income contributors or put another way,
whether the Trust is intent on realigning its housing policy to target more of its low-
income contributors. The aim of the thesis is to investigate what it is about the NHT
low-income housing program, that seems to 'discriminate' against its low-income
contributors. In recent years, the NHT introduced some measures, for example, changes
to the interest rate and income bands to try to 'reconcile the differences', but to date the
efforts have been less than successful. Substantive research has been done in this area,
and recommendations made to help the NHT realize its original objectives of progressive
allocation of its housing benefits. I am particularly interested in doing this study because I
think that the NHT, given its resources the institution is best poised to help low-income
workers house themselves. As such I would like to uncover the bottlenecks in the system
that prevent low-income contributors from accessing the loans. I will also suggest
strategies that could make the NHT at least a facilitator for the provision of low-income
housing. The main thrust of this thesis is not to cast blame, but rather to find reasonable
solutions to the housing problems of the Trust's low-income contributors.
The thesis will, therefore, look at the housing finance9 system in Jamaica, and its
implications for low-income households. It will emphasize the appraisal of the National
8 Klak, Thomas and Peterson G., 1989, Rev. 1990 "Credit and Subsidies in Jamaican Government Housing Programs," Urban
Institute, Washington DC.
9 Housing Finance: The credit supplied by (housing ) finance institutions to households to acquire or access housing?
Housing Trust's mortgage subsidy program as a means of providing housing finance for
low-income workers.
Research Hypotheses
For this research then, two basic hypotheses are tested. The first hypothesis is that: the
Trust has been moving further and further away from its mandate of serving its lower-
income contributors, or phrased in stronger terms, the income distribution of mortgagors,
is characterized by a redistribution of funds, from the lower-income to higher-income
contributors. In other words, low-income contributors are subsidizing those of a higher
income bracket, with they themselves having a very low, and decreasing probability of
being selected for an NHT mortgage.
If these postulates are correct, speculations for possible explanations lead to the second
hypothesis. This is that factors such as, institutional constraints; macro-economic
imperfections; inappropriate housing policy and regulatory framework, and the NHT's
policies all work together, to 'discriminate' against low-income contributors.
1.1.2 Data Sources and Methodology
Scope of Research
Since the research focuses on the NHT, all its low-income and self-employed
contributors make up the target groupl0 . According to the objectives of the Trust
these persons are to be the priority target group for its housing program. The NHT does
not target all low-income persons in Jamaica. Rather, it targets only a subset of that
group, the employed low-income persons who contribute to the Trust.
10 For the purpose of this research, the phrase 'low-income contributor' will also include a 'self-employed contributor'.
Since this research is part of a master's thesis, not all the pertinent issues on housing
finance can be addressed. For instance, the problem of inflation severely limits the
ability of the Trust to meet some of its objectives. I will merely be able to point out some
of the possible effects. I will not be able to undertake any major measurement of the
inflationary impacts on the Trust's operations. Housing finance in Jamaica is a very wide
and varied field and involves cultural, political, as well as economic processes. It is
beyond the scope of this project to focus on each and every aspect of housing finance in
the country. I am particularly interested in how best low-income persons can be targeted
for financing their housing needs. I have chosen to look at the NHT model to determine
how its program can be improved to benefit the greatest number of its contributors in this
income group.
This study will, therefore, evaluate the NHT's housing program since its establishment.
The study will be a broad evaluation of the Trust within the context of its primary
mandate, and the country's macro-economic environment. The essential aspects of the
housing program that will be examined are, the profile of selectees and mortgagors, the
mortgage selection process, its interest rate policy, and its business activities. (See outline
of the contents of study). The evaluation will compare planned objectives with actual
achievements, and draw essential conclusions and make recommendations.
Data and Methodology
The research makes use of primarily secondary data. For data on the NHT, two major
sources are used. These are two existing data bases of information on the Trust's
mortgagors and contributors. The Mortgage Master contains information on the Trust's
mortgagors from 1976 to present. The size of the Mortgage Master file is about 48, 000
records and includes data on mortgagors such as:
- mortgage application date;
- mortgage approval date;
- mortgage amount;
- interest rate charged on mortgage;
- amortization period;
- socio-demographic data such as sex, age, income, occupation, parish of
residence, and place of work at the time of application.
The Contributor File is source of income data for all NHT contributors, but this file is
less current than the Mortgage Master. The 1993 Contributor file utilized for this research
contains data on sample of approximately 175,000 contributors for whom annual returns
were filed by respective employers." The file represents the most complete and current
information on annual income and contribution payments of contributors to the Trust. To
facilitate more refined income analyses, a subset of some 9,000 mortgagors is created by
matching the two files, the Mortgage Master and Contributor file. The files are matched
by using the individual's National Insurance Security number, which appears on both
files.
Both files needed some amount of cleaning to remove errors such as missing data and
key punching errors. NHT's data bases are plagued with these problems, and this has
been a sore point for years. No data file is spared. For instance, to date, the Trust has no
accurate estimate of the total number of their contributors. The data files represent very
valuable sources of data, and as such serious measures should be taken to clean them.
Data errors not only place serious limitation on data analysis, but also place considerable
difficulty in managing such a large business, precisely because these data problems are
compounded each year the number of mortgagors grow.
Before any analysis was done on the mortgage master, all inactive files (such as auctioned
units, frozen files, etc.) were removed. This reduced the total number of mortgage
records from 39998 to 29774. But even with this total not all records are not complete on
1 The size of the Contributor file is about 500,000 employees.
every variable included in the file. The problem of data will be a recurrent point in this
report.
Other sources of data include financial statements, NHT's library reports, departmental
files and reports, policies' papers and personal interviews with key persons in the Trust.
To present a general picture of Jamaica's housing finance system, data from other
housing finance institutions, for example, the Building Societies were collected.
1.1.3 Outline of Chapters
The thesis is of two parts, and comprising five chapters. Chapter two looks at various
aspects of the housing situation in Jamaica and, therefore, provides a 'backdrop' for the
discussion of housing in Jamaica. This chapter briefly gives a political and economic
context in which the provision takes place, and presents the various policies and strategies
that have been tried over the years. The chapter ends with an overview of the institutional
framework of the housing finance system in Jamaica. Part A, therefore, gives an
overview of some of the dimensions of the housing finance problem.
Part B is an evaluation of the NHT's performance in housing its target population. In this
section also, it is demonstrated how factors both internal and external to the Trust
influence its activities. The section starts with chapter three that gives first a profile of
the Trust's target population, and ends with an evaluation of the interest rate and credit
subsidy program. Chapter four deals with the business activities of the Trust. The major
emphasis of this chapter is an appraisal of the NHT's sources and application of its
funds; how external factors such as inflation and government policies, affect the activities
of the Trust are also dealt with in this chapter. For example, a look at the impact of
inflation on the housing resources is done. The study's conclusion and policy implications
are presented in chapter five. The chapter also looks at some alternatives for housing the
Trust's low-income contributors.
2. ASPECTS OF THE HOUSING SITUATION IN JAMAICA
2.1 The Political an Economic Context
The Political Parties
An adequate understanding of the history and transformation of housing policies in
Jamaica relies heavily on understanding the political variable. While a country's
economic situation may dictate, for instance, the amount of money available for
investment in housing construction activities, the housing agenda is also shaped by the
political forces. There are two main political parties' 2 existing in Jamaica. The People's
National Party (PNP), a social democratic party, is led by Michael Manley and now by
P.J. Patterson, the Prime Minister and is affiliated to the National Workers Union. The
conservative Jamaica Labor Party, is led by the opposition leader Edward Seaga and
supported by the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union. The JLP's ten-year reign since
independence in 1962, ended in 1972 when the PNP, under the leadership of Michael
Manley took office, and repeated that victory four years later. But Manley's pursuit of
socialist policies since, deterred large investors in the economy primarily from western
donors. The resultant economic crisis might have caused the subsequent defeat of the
PNP in 1980.
Edward Seaga's first move as the new Prime Minister in 1980 was to seek conciliation
with the international Monetary Fund (IMF) which Manley had rejected in the latter part
of his term of office. The country received some support from the US government under
the Caribbean Basin Initiative during Seaga's reign, but it was not enough to improve a
very crippled economy. In 1986 when Manley returned to power, he reversed his policies
and subscribed to a market-friendly economic strategy, largely because of pressure from
12 There are other political groups which act from time to time as 'watch dogs' to keep these parties in line. The main group is the
Peoples' Workers Party headed by Trevor Munroe. Mr. Munroe's Party has a socialist orientation and is particularly concerned
about the 'perils' of the working poor. The most recent recently formed political group , the National Democratic Movement
(NDM), is made up primarily of a group of defectors who have become disgruntled with the leadership style of the JLP's Edward
Seaga.
the international agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank. The new Prime Minister,
P.J. Patterson has continued where Manley has left off, pursuing the same reform course.
The PNP government, with its emphasis on social services, and expenditure for social
programs, particularly during the 70s, it is not surprising that housing has been an
important component of the government's policies. The National Housing Trust, for
instance was one borne out of the PNP's social regime. Since the administration of the
PNP the government has had various housing programs: the housing component of the
emergency production plan of 1977/78; the 1987 shelter sector strategy; the housing
component of the 5-year development plan, 1990-1995; and the most recent Operation
Pride.
The Economic Trends
Since independence Jamaica's economic development has been characterized by three
main problems; high and persistent inflation, high unemployment, a highly devalued
dollar, and slow economic growth. In the latter part of the 70's to the early 80's,
Jamaica's economy performed badly, but was helped by an influx of American and
international aid in the wake of the Jamaica Labour Party's (JLP) election victory in 1980.
Between 1980 and 1989, the JLP administration pursued a course of widespread
devaluation as part of their free market system. The government, therefore, pursued a
bold program of reforms, tax reform, liberalization of trade and exchange rate regimes,
and the elimination of fiscal deficit. Other reforms included, the strengthening of the
financial sector regulatory framework, the deregulation of prices and distribution
marketing channels, the discontiunance of general food subsidies, the elimination of trade
restrictions and monopolies, and the lowering of external tariffs. The JLP government
adopted basically a flexible exchange rate regime based on the commercial bank
transaction and discontinued exchange controls.
The election of the People's National Party in 1989 made no change to these policies.
The party was reelected in 1993, and the challenge at this time was to sustain and
accelerate the reform to move the economy forward and to improve social conditions. At
present, the government is building up its reserves more slowly than last year, but is still
committed to continuing tight demand management policies aimed at strengthening the
financial system and stemming inflation.
According to the World Bank report, 1995, Jamaica's policy path, if continued, should
allow a sustained improvement in economic performance. But the challenges facing the
government remain great in view of the country's large debt. Success is based to a large
extent on a committed and enthused private sector who continues to invest in especially
the productive sectors (Table 2.1).
Table 2-1: Selected Economic Indicators
Selected Indicators
Year Inflation T'Bill Real Int. Exchange
Rate Rate Rate Rate
US$1=J$
1975 15.7 0.91
1976 8.1 7.28 -0.82 0.91
1977 14.1 7.39 -6.71 0.91
1978 49.4 8.33 -41.07 1.69
1979 19.8 9.56 -10.24 1.78
1980 28.6 9.91 -18.69 1.78
1981 4.9 9.97 5.00 1.78
1982 6.9 8.61 1.71 1.78
1983 16.7 12.38 -4.32 3.30
1984 31.2 13.29 -17.9 4.95
1985 23.1 19.03 -4.07 5.50
1986 10.7 20.88 10.18 5.50
1987 8.4 18.16 9.76 5.52
1988 8.9 18.58 9.68 5.50
1989 17.2 19.09 1.89 6.50
1990 29.8 26.19 -3.61 8.17
1991 80.2 26.56 -53.64 20.91
1992 40.2 33.90 -6.3 22.20
1993 30.1 28.94 -1.16 32.70
1994 26.7 35.91 -9.21 33.32
1995 25.6 23.61 -8.91 39.81
2.2 Dimensions of the Shelter Problem
Constraining factors such as a weak economy makes it necessary for successive
governments to try a variety of housing solutions in solving the country's housing
problem. The following section is a review of the various programs that have been tried
since the 1970s. The section also looks at how the housing problem and the target groups
have been defined over the years. Appendix 1 is summary of other relevant aspects of the
provision of housing such as population characteristics, the housing stock and attitudes
towards shelter and development components and costs.
2.2.1 Definition of the Target Population
Poverty and poor housing seem to go hand in hand, and as such, the most difficult portion
of the population to serve in any housing program, is usually the poor who have low,
and/or unstable incomes. Government housing programs over the years have primarily
been directed to the urban poor living older tenement areas, the urban poor living in
squatter settlements, and the rural poor.
Considering consumption data of 1993, 28% of the Jamaican population fell below the
poverty line of J$70,000. In "per capita terms, it would require an income of J$4.4 billion
(US$130 million) to bring the incomes of all those persons below the line to it" (Brown,
1995). For regional distribution, in the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA) tend to be
more spectacular because of its greater concentration of poor. It is primarily for this
reason that the problem of housing is more acute in the KMA. The majority of the poor
(60%), are however, found in the rural areas.
The poor are young persons. Although only 54% of the population is below the age of 25
years, this group makes up 61% of the poor. Women comprise 51% of the total number
of poor people. With employment, the data show that most of the poor in the labor force
is employed. The majority of the poor are employed as farmers, agricultural laborers,
domestic servants, street vendors, factory workers, craftsmen and machine operators.
Some of these jobs are very low-paying and, therefore reflect very high levels of
underemployment. On the other hand, based on 1993 data, the unemployment rate among
the poor in the labor force was a high 20%, and 70% of these were below the age of 25
years.
The Urban Poor in Tenements
The older tenements are usually located 'downtown' urban areas. These units are usually
physically deteriorated, overcrowded, and lacking in community facilities, though
sometimes water and electricity are available. Tenement slums are made up of yards with
three to five, may be as many as eight families living in very near, all sharing basic
amenities such as stand pipe, kitchen and toilet facilities. Most of these occupants are
usually renters.
Persons in living in these tenements are often unemployed are under-employed, earning
very low incomes. These persons usually earn income in the fourth to fifth quintile of the
income distribution. These facts are supported by numerous surveys done among these
groups. An estimate income for a person in this group would be about J$1,200 or less
per week.
Urban Poor in Squatter Settlements
Squatting is a common urban phenomenon and is among the housing solutions in many
developing countries. Squatters invade, but are not confined to government lands, and
seem to always occupy those lands that are either idle or in marginal locations. It is,
therefore, not surprising to see little 'shanty' areas cropped alongside gullies, in railroad
rights of way, and garbage dumps or river banks.
The structures erected are usually very simple, usually one-room shelters of wood, and/or
waste. As the positions of the squatters become more permanent, the waste may give way
to more durable material. The tenure arrangement is also peculiar in squatter
communities. It is certainly not unusual to have persons paying rent to other squatters.
What happens sometimes is that, the first sets of squatters to an area usually capture as
much land as they can and then rent portions to other squatters.
Studies have shown these areas to be characterized usually, but not predominantly by
unemployment and under employment. The incomes are also low.
The Rural Poor
The situation for some rural poor may be somewhat different, particularly from sugar
estate workers whose housing conditions are made better through Sugar Industry
Housing. For the rest of the rural population, housing conditions is bad; their homes are
frequently one-room impoverished shacks, without any utility. Inadequate social
amenities exacerbate the problem. In mountainous areas for instance, there may be no
regular roads, no water pipes, and residents, therefore, have to carry water for
considerable distances or use polluted streams. Pit toilets are common forms of waste
disposal.
Incomes in rural areas are irregular because, jobs for the most part are irregular. Small
farmers who are earning subsistence incomes are dependent on market, or climatic
conditions. For sugar workers, during the off-season those who are non-unionized will
receive a portion of their wage; those who are not must seek other sources of income.
Considering figures from housing demand surveys of selected parishes, the average
income per persons for the rural parishes was about J$1000 to J$2000 weekly.' 3
Studies have shown that incomes for farmers earning less than five acres range from
$25,000 to $100,000 per year. Sugar workers on large estates and Co-ops now have a
median income of about $160,000.
13 NHT's Research Unit - Housing Demand Surveys.
2.2.2 A Review of the Shelter Policies and Strategies
Housing in Jamaica has been a scarce commodity and for some time now; the demand for
housing has far outstripped supply. Over the years, successive governments have tried a
range of solutions, with varying degrees of success. The country's national economic
constraints have to some extent, restricted the success of these solutions.
This section of the thesis begins with a review of the past strategies and the critical issues
experienced in the implementation of these strategies. The section ends with a
description of current strategies, identifying the main objectives and the program targets
to be pursued to improve the existing housing situation.
2.2.2.1 The Strategies from 1970-1980
The 1970s were characterized by a highly regulated economy with a few incentives to
developers. But in spite of economic constraints such as, a severe contraction in
investments and growth; devaluation of the Jamaican dollar and adverse international
economic development, government housing projects in the mid 1970s represented about
70% of all construction." Such a high government involvement might have been a
reflection of how important it attributed housing to its economic policy. At the time, its
housing programs were seen as a tool to employ a large number of unemployed workers,
thereby stimulating growth in other sectors of the economy.
Housing programs during this period was premised on the encouragement of more private
sector involvement in the provision of low-income housing. During the 70's, therefore,
government policy was directed towards increasing the flow of funds to the housing
sector and encouraging the private sector to enter the low-income housing market.
Government housing activities, consisted of two main programs, direct construction, and
sites and services and squatter upgrading. The main objective of direct construction was
14 The Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ)
to provide accommodation for rental and sale for the middle-income and lower-income
groups. Some of the schemes under this program was, slum clearance, multi-storied units
in urban areas for low-income groups; build-on-own-land schemes; farm housing;
indigent housing, and middle-income construction program.
The sites and services program that actually started in 1975, were a delivery of serviced
lots. A "serviced lot" was composed of a core provided with piped water supply,
sewerage and electricity. The sanitary cores were offered at various stages of completion.
The idea was to provide the homeowner with the option of what best suited her needs,
and ability to complete with her resources. The squatter upgrading program was designed
to improve living conditions in squatter settlements by providing, security of tenure to
residents, infrastructure and community facilities.
To facilitate private sector participation, and to increase the flow of funds to the sector,
the NHT, created in 1976, provided long-term and interim financing to public and private
sectors. The other major public sector finance institution operating during this period was
the Jamaica Mortgage Bank (JMB). The bank played an important role in mobilizing
funds from overseas, and in addition, undertook primary mortgage and interim financing
to private sector investors.
Activity of the private sector was very low between 1971 and 1975, particularly because
attractive finance was not available. But with the expansion of KMA, and when the
NHT came on-stream, the private sector was encouraged to provide unit's within the
Trust's price range to be sold to its contributors. The NHT was also a source of very
cheap funds, and as result developers undertook schemes financed by the Trust. There
was, therefore, an increase in the number of units produced. But towards the end of the
1970s early 80s, macroeconomic factors- devaluation of the dollar, increase in
construction costs, affected the sector severely.
Table 2-2: Housing Completions 1971-1980
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
63
25
534
381
372
816
1203
1181
927
487
11U I
1560
2309
1240
2703
3822
3181
3419
2726
1472
Source: The 5-Year Development Plan -
- 322
- 322
- 90
- 64
300 314
3100 104
2453 -
275 -
1116 204
99 1105
anning Institute of Jamaica
63
25
534
381
672
3926
3656
1457
2043
586
1432
1882
2399
1304
3017
3926
3181
3419
2930
2577
2.2.2.2 The Strategies 1981-1989
In 1982 the government's housing policy was introduced. The focus of the policy was to
increase finance for housing. But this was not to be so easily achieved. The period saw a
significant decline in investment in the construction industry, hence investment in
housing. As a percentage of Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation, housing
investment varied from a high of 12% in 1980, to a low of 4.4% in 1985.
By 1987, it was then very clear that the objectives of the housing policy were not going to
be met. The National Shelter Sector Strategy, became the result of an in-depth look at the
constraints of the sector then. The new approach adopted by the Strategy was a shift in
the national policy, from one of "provider-base" to "support-base" housing. The informal
sector was seen as a valuable source of housing, and as such, support of the informal
sector became a major part of the housing objectives of this period. Within the year
period, the public sector, together with the private sector provided 24,846 housing units.
But the informal sector also played a major role in the supply of housing. The census
data, findings of the Urban Development Corporation and the Ministry of Construction,
showed that there was significant investment in shelter by the informal sector within this
period.
The public sector concentrated on delivering housing through the Starter Home; the
Build-On-Own-Land, and Settlement upgrading programs. As part of the housing policy,
the NHT was to concentrate exclusively on providing and servicing mortgages; interim
financing was discontinued. The JMB also discontinued both its primary mortgage and
interim financing activities. Its efforts were reduced to concentrating on, mobilizing
funds from both local and overseas sources; increasing its secondary mortgage
operations; providing mortgage insurance coverage to private sector investors, and the
issuing of bonds. The Caribbean Housing Finance Corporation (CHFC), created in 1960,
had the responsibility of providing and servicing mortgages to qualified persons who
purchased homes built by the Ministry of Construction (Housing).
Table 2-3: Housing Completions, 1981-1990
Housing Co pletions
Year Public Private Total
Sector Sector
1981 1838 466 2304
1982 5019 1210 6224
1983 2406 2108 4514
1984 1265 1867 3132
1985 1005 861 1866
1986 2121 59 2180
1987 2208 62 2270
1988 2276 120 2396
1989 3234 - 3234
1990 2625 - 2625
Source: The 5-Year Development Plan
- Planning Institute of Jamaica
2.2.2.3 The 5-year Development Plan (housing) - 1990-1995
One of the objectives of the 5-year development plan was to be a review of the past
strategies, taking account of the issues that constrained their success. Some of the critical
issues and constraints to providing shelter, particularly for low-income groups were
identified as, access to land, land use controls, financing, and rent control Government
was to focus its attention on households with annual incomes J$21,500 and less. The
shelter solutions for this period included new construction, upgrading, and the extension
and provision of basic amenities. It was estimated that 15,000 new housing units needed
to be built, and 9,700 to be upgraded, annually to meet Jamaica's housing need for the
planning period (Table 2.4).
Table 2-4: Projected Needs for New Units and Upgrades, 1990-2006
New Units aid Upgrades in '000s
Areas 1990 1991 1996 2001 2006
Kingston
New Units 8.24 7.86 7.76 7.24 8.30
Upgrades 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
Other Urban
New Units 4.52 4.36 4.62 4.62 4.86
Upgrades 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Rural
New Units 2.82 2.33 2.78 3.01 3.37
Upgrades 8.31 8.31 8.31 8.31 8.31
Total Country
New Units 15.59 14.55 15.16 14.87 16.53
Upgrades 9.67 9.67 9.67 9.67 9.67
Source: The 5-Year Development Plan - Planning Institute of Jamaica
The housing strategies for this period entailed limited government involvement in
housing construction. Again, the emphasis was the encouragement of the private sector
participation. Government would also to direct its efforts towards mobilizing financial
resources. These objectives were similar to those of the 70's. In keeping with the
objectives, the NHT in 1990 resumed interim financing to the private and public sector
developers. The NHT would also concentrate some of its effort on the provision of
serviced lots, to target particularly low-income individuals. Considering the table below,
it is obvious that the housing targets were not met. The Greater Portmore development, a
ten-thousand-unit housing project was to provide the bulk of low-income housing units;
the studio units were intended for low-income individuals of the 'downtown' tenements.
But even this project has to date, not successfully delivered its target of low-income units.
Table 2-5: Housing Starts and Completions 1990-1994
Public Sector 2132 4634 3132 23 zLUU/
Privates Sector 938 1664 2578 3670 421
(Greater Portmore) (545) (2144) (2500) (1708)
TOTAL 3070 6298 5710 6045 2428
Housing Completions
Public Sector 2132 2904 2504 2474 2736
Privates Sector 667 899 2699 3573 5094
(Greater Portmore) - (1708) (2568) -
TOTAL 2799 3803 5203 6047 7920
Source: The Economic and Social Surveys - Planning Institute of Jamaica
2.2.2.4 Operation Pride - 1995
The newest of government's housing efforts, is 'Operation Pride', a 'Program for
Resettlement and Development Enterprise'.1 This program represents the government's
commitment to making land accessible and affordable to wide cross-section of persons
who are presently without. This is a new approach to solving the housing problem; it is a
multi-faceted program that emphasizes a collaborative effort between the private sector,
non-governmental organizations, and the public sector. Under this five-year plan, the
program plans to deliver some 20,000 lots on some 76 sites to beneficiaries islandwide.
The strong point of this program is its integrated community focus. Fifteen communities
are identified in 12 parishes, and the emphasis will be on the improvement of
infrastructure. This should result in the "delivery of social services, increase the
productivity of labor force, creation of an environment for investment and ultimate
alleviation of poverty". 16
15 "Operation Pride - Bringing Land to the Landless" The Herald, October 8, 1995.
16 "PNP: Continuing Commitment JLP: Land without Policy", The Daily Gleaner, September, 1995.
The components of Pride are organized around the issue of access to land. The main
components include, the provision of lots for public sector workers; the streamlining of
squatter settlements - slum clearance program, which will curb environmental
degradation, criminal activities, malnutrition, and infant mortality. This strategy differs
from the others, particularly because of the wide cross-section of participants in the
program. For instance, the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management
(ODPEM) is an active participant; the Forest Industries Development Company (FIDCO)
is to develop and store building kits that can be rapidly assembled if there is a natural
disaster.
Pride represents another 5-year housing plan, designed to help the nation meets its
backlog of housing demand. Pride has the potential of at least alleviating some of the
housing problems among low-income persons, but one cannot help wonder whether this
project will eventually end like its predecessors- missing the target. One strong point of
this housing plan is the approach to the provision of housing as part of a comprehensive
development program, where the economic needs of the residents of the various
communities are also under consideration. One major draw back to the program though,
is that the land component is not part of a comprehensive land policy. For instance, the
problem of land titling is one of the constraints to programs such as build-on-own land.
Many lands are without proper titling, especially in rural areas. The leader of the
opposition, made a valid point that, "the lack of a comprehensive land policy may result
in the fragmentation of choice parcels leading to improverishment rather than
enrichment" (Gleaner 1995). Another major drawback is the absence of any commitment
from the NHT. Since it mobilizes such a large sum of money from the target population,
it should, therefore, provide some of the funds for the program.
The problems which have plagued the housing sector over the years could be summarized
as, the unavailability of land particularly in urban areas; the lack of definition and
responsibilities of the different agencies involved in the provision of housing; the lack of
security for long-term financing; the huge increases in building costs; and the
incongruence between the cost of various solutions and the levels of affordability of the
target groups. All the strategies attempted thus far have not been truly successful. Some
breakthrough were achieved in the 70s, but generally, most attempts have fallen very
short of the identified needs. Some critiques have maintained that the failed attempts
have much to do with the shortage of funds in the system, exacerbated by inflationary
induced rising construction costs. Others stress the weak institutional relationships
between the agencies involved in the provision of housing as part of the problem.
The remainder of this thesis will look at the issue of long-term housing finance,
particularly for the low-income groups. The next section will start with an overview of
the housing finance system.
2.3 The Housing Finance System
Housing finance is derived from various sources and channeled through various
institutions. Though duplication and overlap can be advantageous because of the
possibility of checks and balances such a set up offer, this is not the case in the
institutional set up of the housing finance system. There is about a dozen institutions
involved in some aspect of housing finance (Table 6). There are, however, three main
public institutions involved in the finance of housing for low-income households: The
National Housing Trust, Caribbean Housing Finance Corporation and the Ministry of
Housing.
Part of the problem is the absence of a coordinated approach to housing finance between
the various actors, resulting in an inefficient use of the limited funds available for housing
investment. This has reflected in the co-existence of excess liquidity in some financial
institutions and a shortage of investment funds in others. Part of the objectives of the
housing policy of 1982 was strengthen the institutional relationships between the various
housing finance institutions, in particular the public ones. This would include a clearer
definition of the roles of individual institutions, set within a framework of increasing the
flow of funds into the sector. This led to the development of specialized institutions for
primary and secondary mortgage financing.
Table 2-6: Institutions Financing Housing Developments
I- T Se o
Public Sector
Ministry of Housing
National Housing Corp.
Caribbean Housing Finance Corp.
Jamaica Mortgage Bank
Sugar Industry Housing Ltd.
The National Housing Trust
Urban Development Corp.
Private Sector
Building Societies
Insurance Companies
Commercial Banks
Trust Companies
Interim and Long-term
Long-term
Interim and Long-term
Long-term
Interim and Long-term
Interim and long-term
Interim Financing and Develop't.
Interim and long-term
Interim and long-term
Long-term
Short-term
Long-term
Public revenue and grants
Institutional Loans
Institutional loans and bonds
Sugar Industry Authority
Contributions of employers
and employees
Savings and deposits
Insurance premiums
Deposits
Savings
Deposits
.
.
A study in done by Hamilton and Associates in 1989 estimated that 40% of total savings
go towards housing finance. The distribution of the sources of funds for mortgages were
as follows: 17
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9%
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Figure 2.1: Home Mortgage Financing Sources of Supply
USAID Pension Funds
t Companies 6% 4% NHT
6% 29%
ance
nment
Building Societies
Others 19%
14%
Source: Hamilton, Trevor and Associates, 1988
The following section looks at the various institutions, both private and public sectors
that are involved in financing housing in Jamaica. Comparison between each institution
is somewhat inhibited because the data provided for each are not similar. Data were
collected, for most part, from various secondary sources and so consistency in the type of
data was not guaranteed. However, this section gives to some extent, an idea of the
capacity of the nation's housing finance system.
2.3.1 Existing Public Financial Institutions
The main public sector financing agencies are the NHT, the Caribbean Housing
Corporation (CHFC), and the Ministry of Construction (Housing). The majority of state
17 Hamilton, Trevor and Associates, 1988, " Alternative Approaches to Improving Mortgage Affordability".
housing finance is done by the NHT and CHFC as home mortgages. The NHT, however,
is by far the largest housing agency, particularly due its steady flow of funds from its
compulsory salary deductions. The CHFC is the second largest housing agency in terms
of asset base, and is funded primarily loans, example, from the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the NHT itself. The MOC(H), with its focus on
the provision of low-income housing is the third largest finance agency, and certainly
underfunded in comparison to NHT and CHFC. The Ministry received sizable loans
from the World Bank and the USAID in the 1970s and early 1980s.
The Ministry of Housing and the Environment
Though the level of financing for housing has never approached the level needed to meet
the estimated targets, over the years, the public sector through the Ministry of Housing
and the Environment formerly the Ministry of Construction (Housing) has provided a
significant percentage of financing for the housing sector. The primary contribution of
the ministry to housing include, disaster management, assistance to public sector and
other agencies, community amenities and facilities, and some housing schemes. Capital
contributions to Government Housing Development Program, are for the most part made
up of contributions to the Housing Funds. The housing fund is a statutory fund,
established by the Housing Act to be a source of capital for the construction of housing
for low-income individuals. The fund derives most of its capital in the form of grants
from the Consolidated Fund. The fund has on an average, declined significantly over the
years, a decline which seem to coincide with the overall decline in the economy.
The fund ceased in 1990. Contributions to the Housing Fund between 1974 - 1990 are as
follows: 18
Fiscal Year J$ Million
1974/75 13.6
1975/76 24.3
1976/77 26.2
1977/78 41.4
1978/79 41.5
1979/80 28.3
1980/81 17.3
1981/82 0.0
1982/83 0.6
1983/84 0.2
1984/85 0.0
1985/86 29.9
1986/87 10.0
1987/88 9.1
1988/89 8.7
1989/90 5.0
Source Statistical Yearbooks -
Statistical Institute of Jamaica
The Jamaica Mortgage Bank
This mortgage bank was founded in 1971 with a capital of J$40 million. In anticipation
of JMB becoming the main mobilizer of finance for the sector, with an important role of
ensuring a level of liquidity conducive to housing development, the 1982 National
Housing Policy recommended that there be a discontinuation of both primary mortgage
and interim financing activities. Instead the organization was to direct its fullest
attention to:
- mobilizing local and overseas funding for deployment on a
wholesale basis to primary mortgage institutions, to facilitate new
housing construction;
- undertaking secondary market activities;
- providing mortgage insurance coverage to facilitate higher levels of
investment by the private investors.
18 Statistical Year Book of Jamaica, 1994, STATIN
Today the bank has continued down the path established in the 1970s, as a borrower and
distributor of housing guarantee loans.
In the late 70s, early 80s, the organization played an outstanding, financing close to 80%
of all units built in Portmore. The bank benefited from three external funding sources;
the USAID, the Caribbean Development Bank, and the American commercial banks. But
the activities of the JMB was severely hampered by the continued devaluation of the
Jamaican dollar. The organization had to bear the risk of these devaluations.
Today, the bank's primary source of funds is the floating of bonds on the money market.
Its activities are largely confined to the secondary mortgage market for mortgages of
CHFC.
The Caribbean Housing Finance Corporation
Another agency that continues to be directly involved in housing finance is the Caribbean
Housing Corporation (CHFC). The CHFC is attached to the Ministry of Construction
(Housing) and is, therefore, largely subjected to the housing policy. The CHFC Finances
a maximum 90% of the required value of the mortgage, with interest ranging between
10% and 13% a year and the period generally is 25 years. The organization gets some of
its clients from the NHT, but primarily provides and services mortgages to qualified
persons who purchase homes from the ministry The organization also services the
existing mortgage portfolio of the ministry.
The institution has no equity, and uses external credit facilities including a US$30
million-program from USAID. It gets additional funds from the San Jose agreement. The
organization is also involved in mortgage financing for units of the Greater Portmore
housing development. Part of the money for this project is a below-market interest loan
from the NHT.
This, being a statutory institution, CHFC is also subjected to Ministry of Finance growth
targets. These targets constrain the organization as set portions of the funds for providing
must go towards this requirement. As such as much as a third of its funds available
cannot be used to provide mortgages.
The Sugar Industry Housing Limited
This company restricts its housing financing facilities to its employees, which allows the
institution to be more careful in selecting borrowers and grant special conditions. The
financial structure of the organization is very sound. Considering the most recent annual
report, the organization seem to have adequate liquidity at its disposal and is still able to
maintain an acceptable debt to equity ratio. The organization is not distributive and so
the annual surplus is invested capital reserves.
The National Housing Corporation
The National Housing Corporation (NHC) is a housing development company that was
created in 1973 specifically to provide housing solutions for the middle-income
individuals. Only recently has the NHC broadened its mandate to include the lower-
income section of the housing market.
The National Housing Trust
It was estimated that the Trust provided about 29% of the nation's mortgaging financing
(Hamilton and Associates, 1988). Peterson and Klak's report of 1989 estimated the
Trust's contribution to the total annual output of formal sector housing units to be about
40-45%.19 The NHT has to date granted approximately 42,000 mortgages to its
contributors, valuing about J$3 billion, and representing less than half the total asset of
the Trust. The controversy that surrounds the NHT, therefore, is why the NHT is not
converting more of its assets to housing solutions for particularly its low-income
19 Peterson, G. E., and Thomas Klak, 1989, " Credit and Subsidies in Jamaican Government Housing Programs",
contributors. Section B of this thesis is dedicated to looking at the activities of the NHT
in detail, exploring some of the explanations for its predicament, and finding strategies
that can help the Trust in meeting some of its original social objectives.
2.3.2 Existing Private Financial Institutions
Jamaica's financial market is fairly well developed. The savings mobilized by its
institutions, are channeled either directly or indirectly into the housing and mortgage
markets. Commercial banks are the chief mobilizers of savings in the country, but fund
mainly interim financing needs in the housing construction sector. Building Societies, on
the other hand, finance long-term mortgages. Overall, these institutions are not able to
serve adequately the 'small man', particularly because the loans that would be required
are too small to fit within their portfolio. It is for this reason that the specialized housing
finance institution like the NHT is created. There are also trust companies, merchant
banks, credit unions, and the insurance companies that have a significant portion of their
portfolio in mortgages.
At the end of 1994, private sector financial institutions such as the Building Societies, the
Credit Unions and the insurance companies accounted for approximately J$1,754.20
million worth of mortgages. This represented a 15% increase over the previous year
(Table 2.7).
Table 2-7: Mortgages by Values by Major Agencies Jan - Dec 1990 -1994
Agencies Number of Mortgages Value (J$M)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Building Soc. 2205 2579 2696 2424 2400 556 741 906 1225 1500
Credit Union 79 28 30 18 24 11 4 6 5 9
Insurance Co. 276 305 265 538 295 62 99 272 286 245
Total 2560 2912 2991 2980 2719 630 791 1184 1517 1754
Source: The Economic and Social Survey - The Planning Institute of Jamaica
The Building Societies
The Building Societies Association of Jamaica, a six-member organization (Victoria
Mutual Building Society, Jamaica National Building Society, Jamaica Savings and Loan
Building Society, etc.) provides a major source of mortgage financing. The Building
Societies are analogous to the Savings and Loan Association in the United States. These
societies were largely founded by commercial banks, as interest earnings in Building
Societies are not subject to tax, while similar income earned by the commercial banks is
taxable.
Building Societies account for approximately 17% to 19% of Jamaica's savings stock,
and form a principal source of long-term housing credit housing credit. In recent years, to
increase affordability of its clients, Building Societies have used a number of strategies.
These include, the use of flexible debt service ratio requirement. Borrowers can use
between 25% and 30% of their gross income to meet mortgage amortization (principal,
downpayment, service charge, peril insurance and other payment). Building Societies will
only lend as much as 90% of the value, or the purchase price of the property.
Increased access to home funding is also provided under the contractual Mortgage Plan or
the 5% Mortgage Plan. Under this plan the household contracts to save on a regular basis
for a predetermined period, at a specified rate of interest. At the end, savers can then
apply for a housing loan at 5% a year.
Under a partnership program with the NHT. the Building Societies will finance a
mortgage up to 90% of the credit through the Combined Mortgage Certificate program - a
loan facility offered by the NHT in conjunction with other approved lending agencies.
Typically a borrower under this program benefit from an interest averaging about 15%, in
contrast to the market rate of between 19% and 23%. The average lending sum at present
is J$600,000. Under a similar program of partnership also with other public sector
agencies, the Building Societies have undertaken several property developments,
producing housing units as well as service lots. Properties are developed and then
transferred to purchasers without incurring transfer costs.
At the end of 1994, with a loan portfolio of J$1500 million the Building Societies were
responsible for 2,400 mortgages, 55% of the total created for that period. This
represented 55% of the value of the mortgages created. These loans were provided for
the following purposes and were apportioned as follows:
Owner-occupied 84.8%
Agriculture 9.0%
Building Lots 3.1%
Tenanted 2.0%
Hou.scheme, Semi-resid., Commercial 1.1%
Building Societies, however, have not been successful in making more of their mortgages
available to low-income individuals. Considering analysis done in 1991, it has been
shown that between 1987 and 1991, the proportion of Building Societies' loans advanced
to individuals earning more than J$5000 monthly, increased gradually over the years, and
by 1991 they accounted for 96.2% of the mortgages during that year. This was an
increase of 9 percentage points over the 1990 figure of 87.2%. An analysis of the 1991
data showed that a typical Building Society borrower is a 35-44 year old individual
married with two children, is employed as a professional or managerial group and earns
more than J$5,000 per month. Part of the explanation for this skewing of mortgages in
favor of higher income earners was the rapid increases in housing costs, forcing the
majority of low-income earners out of the housing market. The position of low-income
Building Society savers today have still not improved.20
Life Insurance Companies
The government of Jamaica has authorized Life Insurance companies to invest their legal
reserves in housing. With substantial funds of primarily insurance premiums at their
disposal, these institutions can make a sizable contribution to providing housing finance
for their clients. These companies share of total housing finance is estimated to be on
average about 9%.
Insured persons can apply for a mortgage at an interest rate of 19%, provided the housing
is owner-occupied, and is not intended for commercial use. Applicants intend to use their
homes as place of residence as business such as shops or similar activities would incur
interest of 32%. It is not unusual in many developing countries for individuals to use
their premises to support informal business activities to supplement their incomes or to
help pay their mortgage, so such a stipulation would negatively impact their low-income
clients. Borrowers from these companies are predominantly middle- to higher-income
individuals.
Insurance Companies provided 5% of the total mortgages created in 1994, which
represented a J$244.7 million in value.
Commercial Banks
The housing finance portfolio of commercial banks is very negligible. These banks are
primarily concerned with bridging finance of mainly commercial operations at interest of
over 30% or even 40%. Financing mortgages seem to be such an unattractive venture for
20 Analysis of Mortgages Advances 1990-1991, BSAJ, Fact book, 1990.
such entities, particularly because of the heavy administrative component and because of
the very low returns such activities offer.
The Workers of Bank of Jamaica is a commercial bank that is entirely Jamaican owned.
The bank is traditionally known to attract a high percentage of 'barefoot' workers - low-
income savers. The bank has a program called the 'partner plan' that is based on an
informal saving and lending practice among low-income persons. This program is
designed to bring even more low-income persons to save with the bank. Savers in this
program are guaranteed a lower interest rate on loans, but being a commercial bank, the
rates on mortgages are still prohibitive for a low-income borrower.
Credit Unions
The Credit Union Movement is well established in Jamaica and has been involved in
granting mortgages since 1976. There are Credit Unions in every parish. In some rural
areas, no other source of financing is available, since the population is too poor to interest
a profit-oriented institution. Unlike the other credit institutions, Credit Unions confine
their finance facilities to their members. All the local Credit Unions are members of the
Cooperative Credit Union League, an umbrella organization, set up to provide joint
services to other member unions.
The Credit Unions have been keenly interested in loan programs for housing and have
invested in low-income housing developments. With a total combined assets at December
of J$2.7 billion Since 1976, the League has granted more than 2,000 mortgage loans,
totaling more than J$60 million. In 1993, to increase its commitment to housing its
members, the league set up a Housing Development Fund, separately financed. The
Leagues housing program is also funded through USAID Guaranty Loan and NHT
Combined Mortgage Certificate program.
Mortgage Loans are made for open market purchase and build-in-own land. The Credit
Union League grants mortgage loans only to first time owners. Interest rates charged are
below the prevailing market rates and are at 16% under the Central Mortgage Fund.
Under the NHT Combined Mortgage Program, rates are determined by a weighted
average plus 1% management fee. Under this program Credit Union members can each
access mortgage loans of up to J$300,000 from the mortgage fund, along with another
J$600,000 made available by the NHT.
Trust Companies
The mortgage facilities offered by these companies are similar to those available from
Building Societies. But the clientele is somewhat up-market and so interests charge are
high. The lending ceiling is 75% of total, and through the NHT's Mortgage Certificate
Program it is possible to combine the Trust Company funds with those of NHT.
NGO Activities
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have to a limited extent, contributed to the
provision of low-income housing. Among the more well established NGOs are the local
(MSO) and Habitat for Humanity of Jamaica Ltd., both headed by catholic fathers. The
'modus operandi' of these NGOs is usually to adopt communities and work in partnership
in helping them to organize themselves and improve their living conditions. The NGO
projects include but is not limited to some community health care, operating basic
schools, developing cost effective building methods and training members of the
community in income generating skills. A significant activity also is the provision of
shelter. For example, the Mustard Seed Organization is now in partnership with the NHT
in constructing 80 low-income housing units in a slum area of Downtown Kingston. The
NHT has granted a sum of money to the NGO, which is being used to construct 80 units..
To keep the cost to a minimum, residents from the area are employed on the project.
Eligible residents, provided that they are members can apply to the Credit Union and
NHT for loans.
Habitat on the other hand concentrates its efforts on financing and supporting the
construction of locally-controlled housing projects in needy communities. The
organization is now in partnership with the government, under its Operation Pride
program to regularize squatter communities. The organization relies on local self-
initiative in carrying out its projects. A volunteer committee composed of members from
the community directs the work of each local habitat project. Through the local
committee, habitat provides credit to beneficiary families, enabling them to buy building
material and to pay other cost relating to the construction of their houses. Habitat staff
provide technical support and training. Funding for these projects come from churches,
corporations, and foundations. These donations a revolving capital fund for the projects.
Informal Lending
The informal sector has been hailed as a very important source of financing, particularly
for low-income persons. It relies primarily on bits and pieces, improvisation of raw
material, and on personal inputs from the beneficiaries such as labor and direct financing.
But the impact of these practices are very difficult to measure because of the
unavailability of data. The 'partner' system is one example of these informal practices.
This has provided a source of funding for the direct financing for the provision of housing
for some low-income individuals.
The 'partner' system is a group of individuals, regularly contributes a specific sum. This
contribution, often weekly, is small. At the end of regular intervals, usually at the end of
the period that each contribution is due, each contributing member is given the total
collection or 'draw', as it is called. For example, if 10 members participate in the system,
each contributing $10 every week to the pool of money, every week one member would
be awarded the total collection, and so any one member is assured the total collection
every tenth week. A partner system can comprise a sufficiently large group that the
collection can be large enough to purchase building material for home improvements. It
is a common practice for low-income individuals to use their 'draw' to purchase items of
furniture, and is also an important source for downpayment for the home purchase or
improvements.
Considering the foregone, it is clearly established that Jamaica has a well established
housing finance market, with a myriad of housing finance agencies which under the right
incentives and economic environment, seem to be able to mobilize enough funds to
provide housing for the higher income individuals at market rate. Government's main
responsibilities then must include, the development of strategies to strengthen the
institutional framework of the housing finance system, create a healthy economic
environment through the pursual of economic policies that will boost government surplus
leading to lower inflation rates, and create policies which target lower-income individuals
more efficiently.
PART B: THE NATIONAL HOUSING TRUST AND ITS TARGETS
3. WHO PAYS, WHO BENEFITS - NHT'S CREDIT SUBSIDY PROGRAM
3.1 Introduction - NHT's Mortgage Policy
Functions of the NHT
The NHT, a creation out of a joint initiative of the government, the trade unions, and
private sector employers, was to play a key role in the housing market. The Trust was
envisioned to be a chief mobilizer of funds for the housing sector, and was also seen as a
central institution in the provision of affordable housing for the working class. From the
onset, therefore, the NHT was charged with an extremely broad mandate. Its objectives
were wide, encompassing far reaching institutional and national goals. The objectives of
the NHT could be summarized under four broad headings:
1. Objectives relating to the Provision of Shelter
To add to and improve the existing housing stock in Jamaica, and in doing so,
those of its contributors with the greatest need were to benefit first;
2. Objectives relating to the economy
To provide a steady flow of funds to the building industry in order to expand
construction and employment in that sector;
3. Objectives relating to Growth and Operations
To increase the assets of the Trust through prudent investment so that additional
funds could made available for the provision of housing; a way of diversifying the
portfolio of the Trust. Complementary to this objective, the Trust was to maintain
a strong financial position in the housing industry;
4. Objectives relating to Equity
To provide mortgages equitably to those qualified.
Throughout the history of the Trust, all of these objectives were never given equal
emphasis. The emphasis of the housing program has, to a large extent been dictated by
the political orientation and economic objectives of the government (Klak 1995). But
perhaps its main objective is to address the shortfall in the supply of housing to the
working class that cannot be met by the traditional private sector. It was the thinking of
the PNP government at the creation of the Trust, that the benefits to contributors were to
be delivered in a 'socially progressive manner', that is, those contributors with the lowest
incomes were the ones to benefit the most. The commitment to this is expressed in the
Trust's mission statement.
Many families have benefited over the years from the Trust, and many more a looking to
benefit. To assess the access to and the participation in NHT's mortgage lending
program, I will use a vignette of proto-typical, low-income contributors, Mr. Hopeful and
his wife who after many years of contributing to the Trust, and are now looking to apply
to the Trust for a benefit. Mr. Hopeful earns $55,000 and his wife, $50,000 annually.
They are, therefore, both considered as part of the target group of low-income
contributors (persons earning $1,100 and less weekly). This chapter reviews the level of
participation of this group of contributors in particular, in the mortgage program over
the years and, therefore, indicates how successful Mr. Hopeful might be in owning a
home the NHT-way. It also looks at the distribution of the mortgage subsidies among
mortgagors , and test the extent to which the NHT's redistribution objective, that is, the
lower income mortgagor benefiting more, has been achieved.
NHT's Offered Assistance
The Trust provides a mix of housing solutions for its contributors from which Mr.
Hopeful could choose. Housing loans are at extremely favorable terms. At current
inflation rate of approximately 26%, loans are issued for a maximum of 30 years at
interest rates between 2% to 14%. Although the Trust offers eight types of mortgage
loans - the NHT-financed schemes (scheme loans); Open Market; Build-on-own-land;
Home Improvement; House Lots; the NHT-financed Serviced lots; the Mortgage
Certificate program, and the NHT/Employer Joint Venture facility. The scheme loan is by
far the most popular, for both the NHT and its contributors. Mr. Hopeful has no house
yet, so naturally this loan would be his first choice.
Scheme Loan
The NHT offers ready built houses with housing finance of 95%. The schemes are
usually built by small sub-contractors, and offer studio units and one to three bedroom
units. Since the NHT can only build where affordable land is available, the supply of
these units is in most cases way below the demand. For example, in August 1995, the
NHT offered 1000 quads - one-room units, and over 15,000 persons applied. Mr.
Hopeful was one of these applicants, but was not successful; his name was not among the
selected individuals.
Build-On-Own-Land Loan (BOL)
As part of this program the NHT offers contributors with land (leased and family land is
included), funding to build their homes themselves. This is premised on the idea that
persons will be able to build more cheaply for themselves. The loan limit under this
program is J$500,000.
The Hopefuls have no land, but if they can identify a piece of land that is being sold by an
individual or an agency other than the NHT, they could get the house lot loan of J$200 to
help them buy it. Mr. Hopeful's income could carry a loan for J$200,000 but he lives in
Kingston and wants to remain there and land prices are out of this range.
Serviced lots
Contributors to the NHT can get loans to buy serviced lots being sold by the Trust. Under
this program, lots are developed in the NHT schemes and infrastructure like road, water,
street lighting, and sewerage are put in. But land is so expensive in Kingston that these
schemes are also not regularly developed by the Trust.
The NHT provides 95% financing for serviced lots in its schemes. Persons who purchase
these lots can later apply to the Trust under its BOL program for funds to build their
houses.
Home Improvement Loans
For this benefit, loans are granted up J$150,000. It is also possible to make more than
one application. This program posses very low risk, as the offered collateral is usually
high. It is obvious that Mr. Hopeful cannot apply because he owns no house.
Mortgage Certificate (MCP)
Applicants in need of a loan to purchase something on the open market that is more than
the maximum finance provided by the NHT, can make up the required amount by mixing
funds under the mortgage certificate program. This program combines funds from the
NHT and certain selected credit institutions, such as building societies, credit unions,
trust companies and life insurance firms. The net result is a reduction in the overall
interest rate; an interest rate that is higher than the NHT 14%, but lower than the market
mortgage rate.
In this program, the other participating institution handles the loans and bear the entire
risk. The NHT contribution is a time deposit and yields interest accordingly.
But as attractive as this loan type might seem, it is out of the reach of Mr. Hopeful and
his wife. Mr. Hopeful has money deposited with a building society, but even the
combined income of the couple cannot access all of this amount. Also the amount that
they could access he could not afford the interest rate mix between NHT and the
participating income; the interest rate would be above 14%. The mix of funds between
the two institutions would only support 90% of the total loan. The Hopefuls would have
to have money for a deposit of 10%. This they would not be able to find.
Open Market Loan
The predicament is more or less the same for the Hopefuls under this program. The Open
Market loans also allow for the purchase of a house being sold on the open market. The
maximum amount granted under this program is $600,000, but subject to income
qualification. But under the individual benefit policy, Mr. Hopeful and his wife can each
get up $J600,000 from the Trust. With a their income, however, the couple can only
access approximately J$960,000, approximately J$480,000 each from the NHT. The
couple must, therefore, find something that will cost that amount. They are, however,
exempted from the 5% required deposit.
NHT/Employer Joint Venture Facility
Enterprises intending to build owner-occupier housing for employees can combine their
funds with a long-term loan from the NHT. The company generally makes use of its
pension fund for this. The NHT will provide interim financing for construction of units.
The employers' contributions may take the form of land and/or cash, and the minimum
participation is 10% of the total project cost.
The Joint Venture facility also enables employers to assist their employees with mortgage
financing. With the arrangement, the NHT will contribute 45% of the total mortgage
loan, provided that this does not exceed the prevailing ceiling for that particular benefit
type. The participating institution will provide mortgage investment of 45% of the cost
price of the unit or house lot. The mortgagor is expected to add the other 10%.
Here too, the other programs already mentioned such as the Open Market, BOL, and HI
and House Lot benefits can be applied. Mr. Hopeful is self-employed and his wife is an
office attendant in a doctor's office, so this loan is not applicable to them.
General Requirements for Mortgage Application
Each of the above programs has its qualifying and selection procedures, but there are still
some general requirements a contributor must meet if she is to apply for a loan from the
NHT. Eligibility for application is based on a points system. First, a contributor must:
be a current contributor who has made at least 13 weekly contributions to the NHT in the
last 6 months or, at the date of the application; has made not less than one 156 weekly
contributions and has accumulated at least 200 points under the Priority Index
Entitlement (PIE) system. Under this system, points are accumulated as follows:
- Each contributor is allotted 20 points for each year that she contributes.
[Unemployment for any period would reduce the number of contributions,
hence the number of points];
- The Trust allocates a specific number of points to each contributor based
on the income group in which she falls, and
- Contributors can earn a further 100 points from the purchase of home
bonds from the NHT.
The applicant must also be a first-time home or land owner and, in the case where the
applicant owns a non-NHT house, is now in the process of selling it to buy another.
Mr. Hopeful has accumulated a total of 400 points, but still was not able to get one of the
units the Trust had on the open market. This attest to the fact that acquiring the points is
no guarantee for getting a serviced lot or a house in one of the Trust's schemes. Because
of the great incongruence between demand and supply, preference is given to those with
the most points.
NHT Lending Rates
The NHT's lending rates are scaled according to a person's income. The lower the
income group, the lower the interest rate. In an effort to make loans more accessible to
contributors at the lower end of the income scale, starting in August 1995, the Trust's
mortgage rate structure was modified.2 The interest rates now ranging from a low of 2
percent for persons earning under $1,100 per week, to high of 14% for those earning over
$6,500 per week. The Trust added three new interest bands, 2%, 4%, and 14%. The
interest that an NHT mortgagor pays on her loan is based on her weekly income. the
breakdown is as follows:
Other modification included the waiving of the 5% service charge for persons in the 2
percent income group and the increasing of the Debt Service Ratio from 33.3% to 40%.
The next section of the thesis looks at the income profile of Mr. Hopeful's counterparts,
the Trust's contributors, and relates this information to the allocation of mortgages among
mortgagors. This should give a better idea of the chances of Mr. Hopeful becoming an
NHT mortgagor.
21 Monthly Bulletin of the NHT, July 12, 1995
Weekly Iiicom-e ()Interest Rate
Under 1,100 2
1,100 - 2,000 4
2,001 - 3,000 6
3,001 - 4,000 8
4,001-5000 10
5,001 - 6,500 12
Over $6, 500 14
3.2 A Profile of NHT's Target Population
Any discussion about the distribution of mortgage funds between NHT mortgagors must
commence with a look at the profile of its contributors. An income profile of the
contributors gives an indication of how the income distribution of this group matches that
of that of the country. Most importantly though, it gives an indication of the percentage
of the Trust contributor population that falls in the lowest-income category (those earning
J$1,100 and less weekly). On the other hand, a profile of the mortgagors shows clearly
how successful this group has been in receiving mortgages over the years. For such an
analysis, an indication of the number of low-income contributors that are selected each
year of the program is very important, but the inconsistent manner in which this
information has been recorded over the years makes an analysis of data on 'selectees'
rather limited.
3.2.1 NHT's Contributors
The data for analysis are based on a sample of 171,737 contributors, an extract of the
Contributor file as of 1993. Of this total, no income data were available for 27708 (16%)
individuals. For purpose of comparison, incomes of contributors were adjusted to 1995
values.
Considering the data, the NHT contributor population could largely be described as a
low-income one. The median weekly income for the contributor population, was J$1459
weekly, a figure that is below the national median income of J$1731 for 1995. The
income distribution of contributors also shows that as much as 40% of contributors
earned less than $1,100 weekly, and that for this group, the weekly median income was
approximately J$830. Seventy percent of contributors earn incomes less than or equal to
J$3000 weekly (Table 3.1).
22 The size of the Contributor File is approximately 550,000 contributors. The exact size is not known.
Table 3-1: Weekly Income Distribution of Contributors in 1993
Number of Valid
Income Groups ($) Contributors Percent Percent
<1,100 56878 33 40
1,101 - 2,000 28618 17 20
2,001 - 3,000 16612 10 11
3,001 - 5,000 19738 12 14
5,001 - 20,000 20043 12 14
20,000+ 2140 1 1
No data 27708 16 Missing
Total 171737 100 100
Valid Percent - Percentages based on valid cases
Source: NHT's 1993 Contributor file
These data emphasize, the need for the Trust to focus its efforts on reaching more its low-
income contributors. But the fact that this group contributes very little to total
contributions, warrants the question of whether they should be treated 'partially'. The
answer to this question should be yes, since the intention was that the housing program
would be a redistributive scheme, where the higher income contributors subsidize the
benefits to the lower income contributors.
3.2.2 NHT's Mortgagors
3.2.2.1 Number and Size of Loans
Number of loans
Perhaps the most appropriate starting point for examining the characteristics of NHT
mortgagors is to look first at the distribution of loans over the years, since the inception of
the Trust. The distribution of loans gives an idea of the level of output. The variation in
the distribution of loans reflects the variation in the factors that affect the delivery of
mortgages. Such factors could include: policy shifts within the Trust itself; the number of
qualified applicants and the performance of the Trust in the preceding year; the vision for
the Trust held by the political directorate in power at the time; the economic environment
at the time; and the availability of capital, land in particular. Chapter 4 will, provide a
more detailed analysis of how some of these factors influence the Trust's ability to deliver
its mandate.
As of August 1995, the records of the mortgage master showed that a total of 39,998
mortgages had been made by the Trust. This total could be considered a sample since it
excludes some files currently being processed and some not yet entered on the computer.
Also, some special benefits are not yet on this file.23 Of the total 39,998, 919 records
could not be assigned to a specific year. The remaining ones were distributed as follows:
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Mortgages by the
Year Loan was Committed
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The trend in the delivery of mortgages over the years has been positive, with only two
deviant years, 1976 and 1995. In 1976, a very small number of loans were made. Being
the year when operations were started, the slow start that was experienced between 1976
and 1977 could possibly be explained by the problems associated with 'start-up'. In the
year 1995 the percent of mortgages delivered doubled, and in some cases, more than
doubled percentages for the previous years.
To test whether time had any significant influence on the delivery of mortgages, the
number of mortgages is regressed on time (year). The outcome is a positive correlation
between the two (r=.62). A coefficient of determination of .38, suggests that the time
factor can explain some of the variations in the delivery of mortgages. This is not
23 According to the financial statement for 1995, the total number of loans granted since inception was 42,000.
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surprising, since as suggested earlier, NHT's output is affected by the policies of the
Figure 3.2: Number of Loans by Managing Director's Term of Office
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political directorate at the time, a point that will be developed later in the thesis. A closer
look at the figures also reveal a sort of 'cyclical pattern' in the distribution - periods of
increase, separated by troughs. Each period of increase coincide with a passing of the
'baton', change in the political party, hence change in policy directives through the new
Managing Directors (MDs). The distribution to shows a decrease in activities between the
changes flowed by some recovery when the new MD takes control. The figure below
shows the activities during each MD's term in office. 24
Lending peaked in 1980, in 1983-1987 and between 1992 - 1995. The most deviant term
of office of a managing director was that of Hammond; there was hardly any increase in
the number of loans made during his term. Reynolds seem to have the highest record so
far, despite the two bad years of 1991 and 1993. The year 1991 was characterized by very
high inflation rates, which may have negatively impacted the Trust's business activity.
The year 1993 was a year of tight monetary polices.
24 See the report, "The NHT Beneficiaries", 1991 (revised), by Marlene Smith and vincent George. The authors looked at the Trust's
selectees.
What the above data demonstrate is that housing finance, to a large extent is affected the
policies of the political directorate, as well as the macro-economic policies prevailing at
the time. For instance, for each development plan, the NHT is given a specific role to
play regarding the delivery of housing solutions. A part of the role of the NHT in the
1990 - 1995 development plan was an increase in its interim financing activities to private
and public sector housing developments. In 1982, this activity was suspended. Under the
1982 housing policy, the Trust was to concentrate on providing and servicing primary
mortgages.
Since its inception, the Trust, among its competitors, continues to provide the greatest
number of mortgages. But with asset growth, the NHT has been surpassed only by the
Victoria Mutual Building Society (VMBS). 25 With these vital statistics, matched with its
low mortgage rates, what should be the primary role of the NHT continues to be in
dispute. What is sure though is that NHT's contribution to housing for its contributors,
particularly for its lower-income contributor has to be improved. The data also show that,
in relation to the size of its resources, and the size of its contributor population, the
number of beneficiaries is relatively small, less than 8% of the contributor population.
Given this, the NHT must make every attempt at increasing the number of housing loans
granted.
Size of Loans
Any attempt at analyzing the distribution of housing resources among mortgagors, a good
start is to look at the size and type of loans that are distributed. The next step is to see
who actually gets these loans. Also, the combination of loan amounts and the interest
rates charged present an interesting picture of the redistribution objective of the Trust.
Original loan amount refers to the amount of money committed at the time of mortgage
disbursement. For the purpose of this analysis, these amounts were inflated to current
25 Brown, Keith, 1994, "Financial Analysis of the NHT, Victoria Mutual Building Society, Jamaica National Building Society &
Jamaica Savings and Loans Building Society -1993 -1994.
1995 dollars. The revaluing of the loan amounts is an attempt to standardize the loans to
allow for comparisons between them in current terms. Reference to original loan
amounts in current terms are the value of these loans in 1995 dollars. Revaluation have
inflated these loan amounts to large sums. This points at two important issues: the first
is that between 1976 and 1995, the country has experienced extremely high levels of
inflation, and so, in earlier years, goods and services were far less expensive. Earlier
loans were, therefore, much smaller sums; the second is that those who received loans in
earlier years could be considered as now subsidizing the new-comers. But even the
inflated values are still very conservative estimates for housing loans because of the
dramatic increases in house values over the years, as result of inflation and other negative
macro-economic factors.
The mean nominal loan amount was J$128,163, with the smallest loan in nominal terms
being J$57, and the highest being $1,800,000. The NHT introduced a new policy where
up to three NHT contributors can join to access a mortgage loan. With this policy, each
person would be able to get the maximum loan amount, subject to individual
affordability. This new policy has increased individual loan amounts since 1994 to a
maximum of J$1.8 million. The table below shows the nominal loan amounts since
1976.
Table 3-2: The Nominal Values of Loans, 1976 - 1995
Nominal Loan # of Mortgagors
Amounts ($)
< 10,000 830 (3)
10,001 - 40,000 2598 (9)
40,001 - 80,000 4789 (16)
80,001 - 100,000 6507 (22)
100,001 - 120,000 4415 (15)
120,001 - 160,000 2864 (10)
160,001 - 200,000 3070(10)
200,001 - 300,000 1988 (7)
300,001 - 500,000 2324 (8)
Over 500,000 389 (1)
Total 29774
(5) Percentages of valid cases
Source: NHT's 1995 Mortgage Master File
In real terms, mean loan amount was J$528,379, with the smallest loans being J$485, and
the highest being J$18,181,818. Figure 3.3 compares the mean values of loans both in
nominal and real terms.
Figure 3.3: Real and Nominal Mean Loan Values by Year of
Loan Allocation
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3.2.2.2 Income Distributions of Mortgagors
My intention was to investigate whether or not the flow of funds represented a
redistribution of funds from low-income to high-income contributors. But this was
difficult to show. This is because income redistribution that takes place under NHT's
mortgage financing is not systematically related to income, while the contributions to
NHT are strongly and positively correlated to income (Peterson and Klak,1989). This,
therefore, makes the net redistributive impact difficult to determine.
A look at the profile of the NHT's mortgagors will start with a look at data on the
contributor file for 1993. It was possible to match a subset of 9,422 mortgagors with their
income data from the contributor file. This subset was used to examine the income
distribution of mortgagors. Incomes were also inflated to 1995 levels. A glance (which
is what the contributor file provides) at the distribution of mortgagors' income shows that
their incomes were far greater than those of the contributor population as a whole.
Considering the data, mortgagors earning an income of J$1,100 or less were only 10% of
the total. Those mortgagors earning equal to or less than J$3,000 were only 42% of the
total. These income groups together represent 70% of contributors. The median weekly
income for mortgagors was J$3640 in comparison to J$1459 for contributors.
Mortgagors' weekly median income was almost twice (1.99 times) the national median of
J$1,731 for 1995. Information on the distribution of income of mortgagors from the
mortgage master corroborates these findings.
Comparing contributors' incomes with discounted incomes of mortgagors from the
mortgage master showed that mortgagors' incomes were greater than those of
contributors'. Weekly median income of mortgagors was J$3,179, 1.8 times the national
weekly median income. The data, therefore, show that contributors with the lowest
income are not those who have benefited the most from the most from NHT's cheap loan.
Table 3.3: shows that those earning J$1,100 or less weekly make up only 14% of the
mortgagors (the figure was 10% for the sample of mortgagors from the contributor file).
Mortgagors with incomes equal to and less than J$3,000 weekly, make up only 48% of
mortgagors. Table 3.3 shows two areas of bunching in the distribution of mortgagors'
incomes - around incomes J$1,101 to J$3,000 and J$20,000 and greater. Mortgagors in
the income group of J$20,000 and over weekly accounted for 34% of the total, but
represented less than 1% of the contributor population according to sample contributor
file. Here in lies part of the problem - this group seem to be receiving more than their
proportionate share of the mortgages.
Table 3.3: Distribution of Discounted Weekly Income of Mortgagors and Contributors for 1995
Income Groups ($) # of # of Mortgagors
Contributors
<1,100 58878 (40) 1775 (14)
1,101 - 2,000 28618 (20) 2417 (19)
2,001 - 3,000 16612 (11) 1834 (15)
3,001-5000 19738 (14) 1182 (9)
5,001 -20,000 20043 (14) 904 (7)
20,001 -40,000 1603 (1) 1274 (10)
40,001 - 60,000 253 (-) 1285 (10)
60,000+ 284 (-) 1729 (14)
Total Valid cases 144029 (100) 12400 (100)
(40) Percentages of valid cases
Source: NHT's 1995 Mortgage Master File & 1993 Contributor File
Notice that no income data were available for more than 50% of the mortgagors. Missing
data for some variables is one of the many problems associated with NHT's data. The
Contributor file may have provided a much more accurate data on mortgagors income.
There are fewer errors in this file than the Mortgage Master data set. Income estimates
based on the mortgage master are at the very least conservative and it is, therefore,
possible that mortgagors' income could be even larger.
But even with missing data, information on income is at least reasonably reliable since it
matches information derived from the contributor file. Table 3.4 shows the percentage
distribution of mortgagors by income group over the years. The group earning less than
J$1,100 accounted for between 10% and 33% of mortgagors over the years (compared to
40% of contributors). This group received no loans in 1976, but between 1977 and 1982,
this group represented between 10% to 16% of mortgagors, but dropped to single digit
percentages between 1983 and 1987.
Table 3-4: Percentage Distribution of Discounted Incomes by Years
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
7
8
33
13
16
12
Total 14 19 15 10 7 10 10 14
Source: NHT's 1995 Mortgage Master File
The position for mortgagors earning less than J$1,100 weekly increased slightly after
1990, but not to the level of those of the income group J$1,101 to J$2,000 weekly. The
percentage of mortgagors in this group ranged from 24% to 33% (compared to 20% of
contributors). Their position for the most part, has been consistent, and their numbers
have increased towards the later years. The group earning between J$3,000 and J$5,000
has also improved their position in the later years. The deviant group - those earning
J$20,000 and over, represented 28% to 55% of the total mortgagors, though only hardly
being represented in the contributor population. Between 1977 and 1990. Their
numbers, though, have fallen off tremendously after 1991.
Overall then, the data seem to suggest that the lower income groups benefited more in the
earlier years, but their position was has always been behind those of the higher income
mortgagors. However, after 1990, the positions were reversed and the lower income
groups seem to be taking more of the loans. The Figure below shows median income of
mortgagors to be decreasing after 1990.
Figure 3.4: Median Incomes of Mortgagors, 1976 - 1995
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There have been efforts by the Reynolds' administration to emphasize lower-cost housing
solutions such as serviced lots, core/studio units and 2-bedroom scheme units. The focus
has also included the use of small contractors who were able to keep the cost of scheme
units substantially lower than what held on the open market. These cheaper solutions
attracted more lower-income applicants.
But a disconcerting fact is that these low incomes can be explained by other factors. Low
incomes could also be a reflection of the general decrease in real national income.
Nominal incomes have been increasing, but real incomes have been decreasing. The
Senior Director of the Corporate Service division of the NHT, Dr. Vincent George
(personal communication, May 13, 1996) pointed out that what a teacher now earns in
real terms is less than what a domestic worker earned in the 70s. Recent analysis done by
the Trust on the occupations of beneficiaries shows that these low-income are made by
beneficiaries with 'market occupations,' like nursing and teaching. This observation
suggests that what seem like more low-income contributors benefiting, may simply be
higher income earners with overall reduced real incomes.
Nevertheless based on the data, a typical NHT mortgagor is likely a male, of about 36
years, employed in the formal sector,26 and is earning more than the national weekly
median income. Table 3.5 presents the data on sex and age distribution of mortgagors,
and as the total column shows, the majority of mortgagors, 69%, were between the ages
of 25 and 40 years, showing a greater demand for housing among this age group on one
hand.
Table 3-5: Age and Sex Distribution of Mortgagors
Age-group Males Females Total
19-24 703(4) 494 (4) 1197(4)
25-30 3662(22) 2885(21) 6547(22)
31 -35 4322(27) 3509(26) 7831 (26)
36-40 3199(20) 2994(22) 6193(21)
41-45 2061(13) 1799(13) 3860(13)
46-50 1251(8) 1015(7) 2266(8)
>50 1066(7) 814(6) 1880(6)
Total 16264 (55) 13510 (45) 29774 (100)
Mean age = 36 years
Source: NHT's 1995 Mortgage Master File
26 Only 5% of the Trust's 550,000 contributors are self-employed. The figure for mortgagors is even less.
Females accounted for 45% of the total mortgagors27 , and could be more if the NHT had
a policy that directly targeted female contributors. As to the distribution of mortgagors by
age group, there was no significant difference between the sexes. For both males and
females, the age distribution was almost identical to the overall distribution.
3.3 The Interest Rate Policy and Subsidies
A critical aspect of this thesis is the analysis of NHT's interest rate policy. In order to do
this, I will examine how interest rates affect: mortgage affordability of contributors;
program costs; the redistribution or cross-subsidization among mortgagors; and the real
cost of the subsidies attached to these interest rates.
Interest Rate Spread
Interest rates are one of the main tools that the Trust manipulates in an effort to bring
more housing benefits to its low-income contributors. Only recently, the Trust has
lowered its interest rate to attract more low-income persons. Table 3.6 shows the
distribution of interest rates on loans since 1976.
Table 3-6: The Distribution of NHT Rates on NHT Loans 1976 -1995
Interest Number of
Rates_ Morgages
2 164 (.6)
4 2292 (8)
5 249 (1 )
6 1285 (4)
7 305 ( 1)
8 5661 (19)
9 10 (-)
10 18499 (64)
11 67 ( - )
12 477 (2)
13 1 (-)
14 78 (-)
Total 29088
(64) Percentages of valid cases
Source: NHT's 1995 Mortgage Master File
27 This percentage is not low in comparisons to statistics from other countries including the US.
28 Prior to 1992, a scale of interest rates of 6% - 10% were charged on loans, with the best rate going to the lowest income group. In
1992, the rates were extended on both ends to includes rate of 12%. Finally in 1995, three more bands were added, 2%, 4% and
14%.
Based on the table above, it can be seen that over the years, the interest charged on loans
have been much above the average rate of 8.9 %, (or the weighted average of 8.98 %).
The data show that 64% of loans have been made at a rate of 10%. A further look at the
data show that lower rates, that is, rates below 8% was a feature of the 70s and early 80s.
Average interest rates increased after 1977 and continued until 1995 (Table 3.7). During
the 1980s, average interest rates were between 8% and 9%. A concentration of most of
the lending at these high rates may be a possible indication that the individuals who
benefit the greatest are those in higher income brackets.
Table 3-7: Mean Interest Rates by Year by Number of Mortgagors
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
4
305
668
1143
1329
987
1081
2058
2066
2080
1603
2098
1297
1607
1874
1645
2642
1471
1791
2020
Source: NHT's 1995 Mortgage Master File
One resulting feature of NHT's financial structure, is the very wide spread between its
costs of capital and its investment returns. Three fifths of its capital flow, contributions
from employers, are relatively free, in that the Trust does not refund this money. The
remainder consist of employees' contributions, which are returned after 7 years, paying
3% per annum. But over the years, inflation has reduced the real value of these original
payments and one result, is that a lot of this money is not collected because of the small
individual amounts. The conclusion, therefore, is that, the NHT is paying very little for
the use of this money, 1.2% (3% of 40% of contributions made to the Trust). The net
spread on all NHT's has been calculated to be around 12 percentage points. 29 What this
shows is that the Trust does have the financial capacity and flexibility, more than any
other housing institution in Jamaica, to make more benefits available to its low-income
contributors. Its interest rate spread is greater than that which is found in the building
societies or other public sector housing institutions. The next chapter shows how the
Trust uses this spread.
Looking at table 3.8 also gives a hint of how the interest rate subsidies might be
distributed among mortgagors. The table indicates that the Trust has a very limited range
of interest rates, and as such is a sure indication that mortgage allocation system is not
progressively redistributive. If a large range of interest rates are not charged on the loans
made, then differences in loan sizes will offset any differences in interest rates (Peterson
and Klak, 1989). Any policy of cross-subsidization is undermined, since higher loans
will receive larger subsidies, and these larger loans are usually taken up by higher income
groups. This is what is meant when it is said that the subsidies are not targeted according
to need. Interest rates and loan sizes seem to cancel one another out, so that the subsidies
are scattered among mortgagors, irrespective of income levels. But this is not to say that
cross-subsidization is not occurring; as long as there are small and large subsidies some
form of cross-subsidization will occur. What may be happening is that some are
benefiting from others. A look at the relationship between income and the interest
subsidies should tell more. But even without that analysis, the efficiency of this
redistribution of benefits is questionable, particularly since it is obvious that low-income
mortgagors may also be paying higher interest rates. A cross-tabulation of interest rates
and mortgagors income does not confirm that low-income mortgagors are charged
significantly lower interest rates than higher-income counterparts. (Table 3.8).
29 NHT's Corporate Planning Department.
Table 3.8: Mean and Median Interest Rates by Income Groups of Mortgagors
< 1,IUU 6. 1U.U 14
1,100 - 2,000 8.4 10.0 19
2,001 - 3,000 9.1 10.0 15
3,001 - 5,000 9.5 10.0 g5,001 
-20,000 8.9 10.0 720,001 - 40,000 8.0 8.0
40,001 - 60,000 8.4 8.0 10
60,000+ 9.0 10.0 10
Source: NHT's 1995 Mortgage Master File
3.3.1 Cost of Subsidy
Much of the analysis in this section follows the format used by Klak and Peterson in their
work done on the NHT in 1989. As such, this section of the thesis updates what has
already been done on this subject.
The purpose of this section is to quantify the below market interest rate subsidies enjoyed
by NHT mortgagors, and how these subsidies have been distributed among its
mortgagors. But first, it must be mentioned that subsidies are being used in its narrowest
sense, in that subsidies from arrears are not included. The estimates of subsidies on
NHT's mortgages are only a part of the total subsidy incurred by the Trust housing
program. However, what this analysis gives, is a picture of how efficient and progressive
NHT's mortgage subsidy program is.
The measurement of the interest subsidies is the current annual mortgage payment,
multiplied by the difference between the market and the NHT's mortgage's interest rates.
This is a very conservative estimate, but it does capture the annual monetary value of
interest foregone by charging less than market rate. Market rate here is defined at 19%,
which is current rate charged by the building societies, NHT's closest competitor. But, as
mentioned earlier, even the building society rate is not market rate, since this rate is
substantially below inflation rate.
Based on the above then, the equation for NHT's annual interest subsidy looks like this:
ANNUAL INTEREST SUBSIDY = ORIGINAL LOAN BALANCE X (MARKET
INTEREST RATE - NHT INTEREST RATE
The equation measure the interest NHT's foregoes by charging less than market rate. To
derive NHT's mean value of interest subsidy, the mean values for loan amount and the
interest rate are inserted in the equation. To get the true mean interest rate, a rate
weighted by loan amount is used. This rate is therefore, 8.95 instead of 8.9. NHT's
mean annual interest subsidy is equal to:
J$528,379 x (.19 - .0895) =J$53,102.
Using another method, mean annual interest subsidy = J$ 53,162
A good estimate is somewhere between these two numbers.
NHT's total annual interest subsidy for 29769 mortgagors equals:
J$15,370,000,000 x (.19 - .0895) = J$1,544,685,000.
Using another method, the total interest subsidy comes out to be J$ 1,582,552,633.
The above estimate of NHT's interest subsidy is quite large, but is still very conservative,
particularly because interest rates in the market fluctuate. However, since interest rates of
the building societies are fixed, the estimates provide a reasonable preliminary measure of
NHT's interest subsidies.
As a measure of opportunity costs at current rates, NHT's annual interest subsidies could
finance the mortgages for 3,433 studio units of 216 sq. ft, at a price of J$450,000, and
approximately 7,021 serviced lots at J$220,000. This gives an idea of the depth of the
value of NHT's interest subsidy. The values of the interest subsidies are very large, both
in the aggregate, and at an individual level. The explanation for this lies not only in the
large sizes of loans, but also in the low interest rates. Low interest rates, especially with
large loans, as will be demonstrated later, do produce deep subsidies (Table 3.9).
Table 3-9: Mean & Median Interest Subsidies by Year of Loan Allocation
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
3329/
50980
55266
46561
46236
45671
61503
75250
66696
52849
48797
53112
49046
52595
57422
57427
43967
50372
42054
47334
19131
43671
44490
44963
46823
37183
58872
80321
69392
60831
52608
47653
45294
50385
57376
50409
37430
49671
46810
43267
6.5
6.7
6.3
7.1
7.4
7.7
8.7
9.4
9.4
9.3
9.1
9.5
8.5
9.1
9.6
9.9
9.9
9.8
4
305
668
1143
1329
987
1081
2058
2066
2080
1603
2098
1297
1607
1874
1645
2642
1471
1791
2020
Source: NHT's 1995 Mortgage Master File
Table 3.9 also show very well how large these subsidies are annually. Ninety four percent
of mortgagors get interest subsidies of a value ranging from less than J$30,000 to
J$90,000. Both mean and median values of subsidies are over J$40,000 annually. This
works out to be about $800 weekly. The mean and median values of the subsidies are not
very far apart which suggest a slight tending towards a normal distribution that may
suggest that some level of redistribution of funds is indeed occurring among mortgagors.
The next logical question to ask then is, whom are the mortgagors getting these subsidies.
Another interesting observation is that lower interest rates do necessarily produce lower
subsidy amounts, nor does higher interest rates - higher subsidies.
3.3.2 Distribution of Interest-Rate Subsidies by Income and Loan Size
A cross-tabulation of the incomes groups with subsidy groups, indicates that mortgagors
benefiting from larger subsidy amounts are of two income groups; those having incomes
ranging from J$1,101 to J$5,000 weekly, and those with incomes J$20,000 and greater.
These mortgagors together, make up 77% of the total. The data show that the Trust target
low-income group (J$1,100 weekly) receive lower subsidy amounts. The data suggest,
therefore, that on an average, it is those in the middle to higher income groups who
receive a larger amounts of the subsidies. Figure 3.5 shows the mean and median values
of subsidies by income groups.
Middle- to high-income mortgagors are also the ones who get the larger loans. A
combination of these large loans with low interest rates produce very substantial subsidy
amounts for these groups. The intent, therefore, of cross-subsidizing smaller loans or
lower-income groups are not realized. Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of mean and
median loan values among the different income groups.
Figure 3.6: Distribution of Mean and Median Real Loan Values by
Income Groups
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A further look at the relationship between interest subsidies, loan size and incomes show
that there is a perfect one-to-one correlation between interest subsidies and loan sizes.
When subsidy is regressed against loan amount, person's r = 1. The coefficient of
determination r2 is also equal to one. Observations from the data show that when loan
size is held constant and subsidy is regressed against interest rate, the relationship
between interest rate and subsidy is positive but not significant. But this is not surprising
since interest rate does not change much. Estimates from the data do show, however, that
lower interest rates produce higher subsidies. Holding interest rate constant, the
relationship between subsidy and loan amounts is a strong and significant one (Table
3.10). These results are suggesting that contrary to popular thinking, the manipulation of
interest rates may not be the most effective way to redistribute the subsidies from large to
small loans, at least not when the spread between the rates charged is so narrow and some
loan amounts to higher-income contributors are so large. Based on the analysis of the
data, large loan amounts seem to nullify the effects of the below market interest rates for
low-income contributors, and even possibly result in reverse cross-subsidization.
Table 3-10: Pearson and Partial Correlation Coefficients for Interest Subsidies, Interest Rates and Loan
Amounts
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Interest Subsidy
Interest Rate
Loan Amount
Interest Subsidy
.0432
(29083)
P=.000
1.000
(29769)
P=.500
Interest Rate
.0432
(29083)
P=.000
.0432
(29080)
P=.000
Loan Amount
1.000
(29769)
P=.000
.0432
(29769)
P=.000
(Coefficient/D.F./1 -tailed Significance)
Partial Correlation Coefficients -
Controlling for Loan Amounts
Interest Rate Subsidy
Interest Rate - .0432
(29083)
P=.500
Subsidy .000
(29080)
P=.500
(Coefficient /D.F./1-tailed significance)
Partial Correlation Coefficients -
Controlling for Interest Rates
Interest Subsidy Loan Amount
Subsidy - 1.000
(29080)
P=.000
Loan Amount 1.000 -
(29080)
P=.000
(Coefficient/D.F./1-tailed Significance)
Source: NHT's 1995 Mortgage Master File
Given the fact that prices for housing solutions will continue to increase with increasing
inflation rates, the Trust has to find suitable pragmatic means of targeting these cheap
subsidies to those who are most in need.
To support the argument further that larger loans attract larger amounts of subsidies, a
look at Table 3.13 shows that the more expensive loan types, scheme unit loans, build-on-
own land loans, and purchase on the open market had larger mean subsidies. Subsidies
relating to scheme units have the potential to grow even more than the other loan types
because unlike the other loan types, there is no loan ceiling. Qualified mortgagors are
granted 95% of the cost of the unit. The other loan types carry with them ceilings on
loan sizes.
Table 3-11: NHT's Annual Interest Subsidies by Loan Types
Build-on-own-land 66210 19
Scheme Unit 58588 57
Open Market Purchase 48727 9
House Lots 21003 -
Home Improvement 17379 14
Source: NHT's 1993 Contributor file
The larger the subsidies, the less funds are available for making more loans. It may make
better sense for the NHT to concentrate their its on making smaller loans, especially since
low-income persons cannot afford larger loans. The Trust may redistribute its housing
funds among mortgagors in a more efficient manner if more emphasis is placed on
making smaller loans such as those for serviced lots and home improvement activities,
rather than on increasing loan limits. The Trust is, however, faced with the problem of
high land costs in urban areas, particularly in Kingston, where the housing problem
among low-income persons is more acute. But the Trust's new individual loan policy,
where individuals can join with others to increase their loan limits may not be effectively
distributing subsidies among mortgagors, since its potential of increasing loan limits will
serve to skew interest subsidies more in favor of persons with higher incomes since only
they can afford larger loans.
In concluding then, the data show that the majority of NHT's contributors are low-
income persons. But these persons are not the ones who benefit the greatest from the
Trust's funds. There is some amount of redistribution of funds occurring among
mortgagors, but the redistribution seem to be arbitrary, where some low-income, and
more higher income persons benefit from large amounts of interest subsidy. There seem
to be two main factors that contribute to this, the fact that the range of interest rates
charged on loans are not wide enough, and that loan amounts are large. The data also
show that interest rates explained only to a small extent the depth of the subsidies, that is,
the relationship between interest rates and subsidy amount was low. This suggests that
the NHT's preoccupation with manipulating interest rates may not be the key to making
the system of below mortgage subsidy more redistributive, especially since these rates are
so far from the market rates, and also since increasing loan limits nullify the effects of the
interest rates.
Considering the analysis, the options available to contributors like the Hopefuls seem
limited, and things are even more daunting since continued contributions to the Trust for
this group translate into a negative expected value. This is further evidence that the
existing system of mortgage credit is unfavorable for low-income contributors. Given
Mr. Hopeful's income; the probability of him receiving a loan; the value of the mean
interest rate subsidy received by this group; and his total contributions, assuming he has
been contributing for 7 years, the computation of the expected value of Mr. Hopeful's
contributions is a follows:
BENEFIT = Mean annual subsidy = $41,000 ( from previous calculation)
Present value (7 years, 24%3o) = J$132,934.943
COST = total contributions in 1 year = J$ 1,100
Present value of contributions (7 years, 24%) = J$3566.54
PRESENT VALUE OF NET BENEFIT = J$132,934.94-J$3566.54
= J$129,368.39
Forty percent or 220,200 contributors fall in the low-income group. Since only 14% or
4,168 mortgagors are in this income group, the probability of Mr. Hopeful getting a
30 The Treasury Bill rate for 1995.
31 Pv = C[l/r - 1/ (r (1+r)' )], where C is the cashflows; r is the discount factor; and t is the discount period.
mortgage is 0.0189. The Probability of Mr. Hopeful not getting a mortgage is 0.9811.
Therefore, the expected value to Mr. Hopeful =
(0.0189 x J$129,368.39) - (0.9811 x 3,566.54)
= J$2,445.06 - J$3,499.13
= J$-1,054.08
This expected value is a loss to Mr. Hopeful, and if the rate of inflation continues to
increase, and his nominal income also increases, requiring an increase in the amount
contributed, the loss to a contributor is likely to be more. The fact that the expected value
translates into a loss suggests that the odds are against Mr. Hopeful. Nevertheless,
continuing to contribute to the Trust give him even a small to benefit.
The Hopefuls could look for a plot of land to buy outside the Kingston area where land is
cheaper, and apply for the house lot loan. This loan type is not in high demand as the
scheme unit and no queuing is involved. The Hopefuls could later apply to the Trust for a
BOL loan. Another option is that they continue to wait and hope that they are included in
selection for the next available batch of studio units. But the prices of the new units
could become unaffordable for the Hopefuls. The Trust has decided that for new units,
applicants will be selected from group of unsuccessful applicants in the last intake. This
certainty will increase the chances of the Hopefuls. While they continue to wait, their
contributions are accumulating which gives them more points. Each contributor is allotted
20 points for each year that she contributes. Also, A contributor can earn a further 100
points by purchasing home bonds. It is hoped that both the Hopefuls will still be
employed by the time the next batch of units are available; unemployment would
disqualify them. It is also hoped that the Hopefuls will have extra money available to
purchase bonds.
The next chapter, to a certain extent, give some insight in how the Trust allocates its
funds between housing and other types of investments. It also gives an idea of what are
certain factors that may influence the Trust's ability to make more of its benefits available
to individuals like the Hopefuls.
4. NHT'S BUSINESS ACTIVITIES - ITS SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
This chapter examines how the Trust deploys its funds, particularly how it allocates funds
in and out of investment in housing, and how different factors, both internal and external
to the NHT affects its activities.
4.1 Its Business and Financial Activities - An Overview
The NHT is considered as a huge mobilizer of funds. A lack of funds is never cause for
the ability of the Trust to provide loans to the majority of its applicants. As mentioned
earlier, this is partly because of its steady flow of cheap funds from contributions. The
volume of contributions has maintained a positive trend. At least for the last seven years,
total contributions has been approximately 50% of total income. Another important
source of income for the NHT that has maintained a positive trend over the years is,
interest payments on investments and loans.
Table 4-1: Total Operating Income 1986 - 1995
ontributions 169,306 206,127 247,034 423,883 707,683 1,108,791 1,580,963
Interest on:
Investments and loans 164,512 211,383 306,704 342,197 454,137 648,048 1,092,630
Finance for Hous. Construct'n - 2,030 118 22,798 550,000 101,642 82,207
Gains on Disposal of hous. units 3,400 1,499 2,181 11,556 921 2,827 2,058
Service Charge on loans 5,143 339 1,935 2,325 3,135 4,709 4,918
Penalties 8,235 12,423 8,268 - - - -
Miscellaneous 1,214 5,088 5,041 6,354 23,570 43,908 86,815
Total Income 346,667 436,859 571,281 809,113 1,739,399 1,909,925 2,847,533
In aggregate terms, NHT has been able to maintain an overall increase in its business
volume since its creation. At least for the past 10 years, NHT has been able to maintain a
surplus in operating income. A look at its business activities for the period 1986-1995,
has also shown significant increases in its asset base. Total assets averaged an increase in
nominal terms of at least 26% between 1986 and 1995. The data also show that for the
past 10 years the Trust experienced an average increase in liquid funds of over 35% in
nominal terms and over 8% in real terms. Growth in the asset base is a welcome trend,
but growth in liquid funds (Treasury bills, Investments and Current Assets), suggest that
less resources are being made available for mortgage loans.
The data show that proportionately less of its funds are going into housing investments.
For instance, though the nominal value of mortgage loans to beneficiaries has been
increasing over the years - from J$607.8 million in 1986 to J$4,083.8 million in 1995, the
mortgage loans to total assets ratio was low, 55% and decreased over the period. This an
indication that proportionately less funds are being invested in loans. Overall, housing
finance has been on an increasing trend, from J$721.118 million in 1986 to J$5,107.6
million in 1995. But as a percentage of total assets, finance on housing represented an
average of 67%. The share of housing construction to total assets was even lower, an
average of approximately 11% for the period under study.
Table 4-2: Percentage Distribution of Components of Housing Finance, 1986 -1995
Increase in Housing Finance 1 1 2 6123 3 3
Hous. Finance as a % of Contributions 9 6 11 10 13 9 9 9 0
Hous. Finance as % of Total Assets 77 3 71 2 68 6 63 3 59 8
Mortgage Loans as % of Contributions 62 84 89 84 86 85 81 75 74 82
Mortgage Loans as % of Total Assets 65 65 66 60 58 55 51 48 46 46
Hous. Construction as % of Total Assets 12 8 5 12 10 12 11 15 13 12
NHT's finance for housing construction has increased, though at a decreasing rate, has
compensated for the low and declining mortgage loan to total asset ratio. There are few
possible factors contributing to this low ratio and the rest of the chapter will explore some
of these. However, as the Trust continues to invest a fair proportion of its assets into
financing housing, it is necessary to deliberate whether the Trust's resources, the bulk of
which is its contributions should be:
- used for housing construction;
- or used to create more mortgages particularly for its low-
income contributors.
4.1.1 NHT's Activities and the Wider Economy
The operations of the Trust are guided by certain government policies, and to a certain
extent, influenced by the overall health of the economy. For instance, a government
directive is that government lending institutions must provide a significant part of their
liquidity for the purchase of government securities. NHT's business activities are also
constrained by the nation's high-inflation economy. High inflation economy has had
some impact on the Trust's sources and use of funds; its total operation. Inflation
reduces the real value of major source of funds, the contributions, and increases the cost
of its benefits to contributors.
Jamaica has a fairly well developed money market, but it is nevertheless characterized by
discernible peaks and lows over the years (please see chapter 2). Sharp devaluation and
increasing inflation rates influence the flow of money in and out of the housing finance
market. To counteract these negative macro-economic influences, it is customary for
housing institutions like the NHT to invest large sums on the money market, rather than
housing for low-income persons. For long-term investments, property funds are usually
chosen and these often linked to hotel and tourist funds or other, more stable capital
investments.
One of the ills of inflation is its impact on building cost, effects which are passed on
directly to consumer. For instance, when inflation reaches highs as much as 80% (as was
the case in 1991), this produces a doubling of construction costs. Increases in unit costs
are further heightened by the long building approval/construction process and also
mortgage processing, increases which applicants would not have been prepared for in
advance. Interest rates on mortgages and construction loans at high rates of inflation is
another matter. For example at an inflation rate of 80%, a realistic market rate if inflation
is expected to fall, would be about 47% a year. Only purely commercial buildings can be
financed at these rates. Low-income borrowers can only afford very low mortgage rates.
Middle-income borrowers may be able to afford around 19%. Furthermore, it would not
be prudent finical policy for lending institutions to lend at high interest rates as this
practice might in the long-run be counter-productive, derailing governments efforts at
reducing inflation.
4.1.1.1 The Impact of Inflation on NHT's Activities
Changes in Assets
Though inflation has had some impact on the resources of the NHT, for example,
diminishing value in real terms of contributions from wages, for the past 10 years, except
for the period 1991 to 1993, (a period of high inflation, negative interest rates and the
falling value of the dollar), the Trust recorded an increase in real assets (Figure 1).
Analysis by the Corporate Planning Unit of the Trust in 1995 estimated the average
growth of total asset for 1976 to 1995 to be 33.93%, an 8.56% growth rate over an
average inflation rate of 25.23%; a sure indication that the Trust is not being
32decapitalized. Between 1991 and 1995 also, in real terms the balance sheet total
expanded by an overall 21%. In current terms, the overall expansion was 70% for the
same period (Appendix 2).
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Changes in Housing Expenditure3 3
The annual housing expenditure has fluctuated in real terms over the years. Based on
Browns findings, "the general tendency is for the real value to decline substantially and
then partly recover before substantial decline". Therefore, with 1978 3 as the base year, at
the end of 1995, housing expenditure was estimated to be 12.4% below the real value of
1978. The report shows too, that overall, except for 1979 and later, the level of housing
expenditure was consistently below the real value of 1978. This is reflected in a
persistent growth index of less than 100 in all but the two years, 1978 and 1979. The
figure below shows the changes in housing investments from 1977 to present.
Figure 4.2: Values of Housing Expenditure, 1978 - 1995
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Despite high rates of inflation, between 1976 and 1995, the Trust has not experienced any
erosion of its asset base. The Trust has for the most part, been buffered by the
simultaneous raising of cheap funds with investing in stable fixed assets, and lending, in
excess of its equity-type reserves. It is therefore, obvious that the Trust has the capacity
to maintain positive real value in housing expenditure, and also higher loan to asset
ratios, but would require investing less into so-called safer assets such as short-term
33 These Figures are from Brown, 1995, and represent a proxy for annual housing expenditure. The proxy is the difference between
closing and opening figures in the housing investment portfolio.
34 Brown' used 1978 as the base year since 1977 was the Trust's first year of existence and activities were low.
investments (Figure 3). But how the Trust shuffles funds between housing and other
investments is largely influenced by the policies of the government. For instance
increases in short-term investments is also a Ministry of Finance (MOF) requirement that
the NHT meets a stipulated ratio of its cash and short-term investments. This
requirement and other government policies will be expounded on later in the chapter.
Figure 4.3: Value of NHT's Contributions, Mortgage Loans, Total
Assets and Housing Expenditure, 1986 - 1995
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Another problem experienced by mortgage lending institutions like that of the NHT is
finding a mortgage finance system that can deal with the shocks experienced in high
inflation-economy. This can be a mammoth task particularly because of the inter-
relations between the different aspects of housing finance, the countervailing forces of the
sustainability of the funds for lending, and the affordability of the funds for borrowing.
The NHT has been spared some of the negative consequences of inflation particularly
because of its very low cost of funds, 1.2%.
Given this then, the main problem is making mortgage funds affordable to a majority of
contributors. One strategy used is lowering the initial costs of financing so that
homeownership becomes more affordable. But this can make the system unsustainable;
the real rate of return can become so low that the supply of funds mobilized to fund such
'affordable' mortgages continually contracts in real terms. Similarly increasing future
mortgage repayments to match increases in inflation preserves the real value of funds that
are mobilized through the institution. But unless the income of borrowers is also
increasing, allowing them to keep pace with the increases in prices, payments can become
unaffordable.
Mortgage lenders have tried various instruments to battle the mortgage tilting problem,
that is, when inflation causes real payments to be redistributed towards the early years of
the loan. This tilting of the real repayment stream causes an increasing mismatch
between real loan repayments and the income capacity of the borrower over the life of the
loan. The NHT has introduced the graduated mortgage payment (GPM) instrument for
most of its mortgages in order to combat this tilting problem. This mortgage instrument
works by having relatively lower payments in the earlier years of the loan. The theory is
that borrowers' income will rise in later years, and that payments will rise at expected
rates of inflation. But the risk of the lender is increased tremendously, particularly in the
Jamaican context where inflation levels are usually very high (in the long-run the one
who benefits in is the mortgagor where her equity position increases in real terms, an
equity increase in which the lender does not share.
The conventional straight line mortgage method, protects the lender to a certain extent
because amortization of the loan starts immediately. But under inflationary conditions,
the protection is limited mainly because the contract is locked into a fixed mortgage rate.
For example, consider a family income of J$70,000 per year (J$1,346 per week), and
paying 30% of this initial income for mortgage payments on a 30-year fully-amortizing
fixed rate loan. In a world of zero inflation, and a 6% real interest rate, this payment
would be sufficient to finance a loan for about J$306,400. If inflation increases to 10%
the lender should increase nominal lending rate to about 16% to compensate lender for
the erosion in the value of later payments. The borrower with the same amount of income
could only afford a mortgage of J$150,400. At a mortgage rate of 16%, for a loan of
J$306,400 would require an annual salary of approximately J$130,000.
The analysis shows that some of the inflation risk of the lender is being passed on to the
contributors' 3% yield deposits. Along with the negative interest, contributors have also
been burdened with increasing price trends in the building industry. It is shown that
within reasonable limits of inflation, the Trust can maintain some growth in real assets.
It becomes government's responsibility, therefore, to devise policies to maintain inflation
within reasonable limits so that the Trust will be able to recover the real value of its loans
to mortgagors, and disburse the same real value to new mortgagors. The Trust's
responsibility among others is to devise steps to increase the real value of housing
expenditure.
4.1.1.2 The Influence of Government Policies and Politics on NHT's Activities
4.1.1.2.1 Structural Adjustment Policies
Some Implications for Mortgage Rates
Policies advocated by international donor agencies such as the World Bank, USAID,
IBRD, and the IMF for economic growth as a whole has had some impact on the
activities of the Trust. Jamaica has been under structural adjustment policies since the
late 1970's, but in the late eighties, early nineties, these policies have been extended to
the housing sector. This is particularly because the housing sector has been viewed as
absorbing a lot of foreign exchange. The sentiments have been that there are better ways
to utilize scarce foreign exchange. Government housing programs, therefore, become a
major target for cut backs under the economic restructuring policies. It is often argued
that housing funds such as the NHT's are better put to productive use. Reliance on the
market to allocate scarce resources, and the promotion of private sector activities, with
reduced direct government intervention are also part of the structural adjustment
strategies. Clearly then, the NHT's housing program would definitely be at odds with the
government's market oriented economic restructuring policies.
Some structural adjustment policies incorporated in the 1990-1995 housing development
plan included the curbing of direct government housing construction to make way for
increased housing finance, particularly for the private sector. Notably, the interim
financing of private sector housing projects by the Trust increased. But how such an
approach was to benefit the target group was questionable, primarily because the
motivation of the private sector is based on profits, and therefore, a strategy which with
no incentives, example, tax breaks would hardly be enticing to the private sector. The
inability of the private sector to provide adequate housing solutions for the target group
was one of the main reasons the NHT was created.
Structural adjustment policies were also extended to the interest rate policy. Since NHT's
mortgage rates are way below the market rate, in Jamaica's inflationary economy, real
interest rates are highly negative. We see that same applies to most other housing finance
institutions such as the building societies, whose interest rates are below inflation rates.
The interest on mortgages for building societies is currently 19%.35 With inflation rates
of 25.6 % in 1995, it means that real interest rates are highly negative. But for reasons of
social welfare, the NHT has resisted pressure from these donor agencies to adjust interest
rates to market levels.
There are two issues that seem to weaken the argument for market level interest rates.
First, there is no clear definition as to what constitute market rates, and second, there is
no evidence to show that charging market rates would indeed help solve the housing
shortage, particularly among the target group. From an economic point of view, market
interest rates should offset the inflation rate and yield certain positive real returns.
Housing institutions like the building societies offer loans at rates that do not compensate
for inflation. But based on the evidence presented in chapter 3, manipulation of the
interest rates is only a small part of the remedy. The NHT has increased its interest rates
over the years, though not near market levels, but nullifies the effect because it maintains
a narrow range between the actual rates charged on loans. The data also show that there
35 Building Societies are regulated by the Central Bank and as such there interest rate structure is also regulated.
is a significant percentage of NHT's contributor population for which any interest on
loan for even the cheapest solution of is still unaffordable to them. There seems to be a
case then for other alternatives.
The debate also continues around the issue of income versus interest subsidies. The main
argument has been that income subsidies are more easily targeted. But that may not be
true if the problem of mistargeting is partly an administrative one. Income subsidies call
for adequate administrative capabilities, and is difficult to see how the administration of
income subsidies is likely to be any easier than interest subsidies for the NHT. Also,
there would be the problem of defining income, individual income or family income, and
the irregular and varying sources of income.
There is enough evidence to show that interest subsidies distort the market, but so too can
be the case of income subsidies. Bearing in mind that distortion occurs when those not
entitled are those who claim the benefit, without efficient management capabilities,
income subsidies could also go to those who are not entitled. There in lies the problem.
What has been clear from the debate however, is that NHT's reliance on the manipulation
of interest rates to better help their large low-income contributor population, as brought
out clearly in the preceding chapter, is only a partial solution.
Subsidizing the State Budget?
A related structural adjustment constraint on the Trust's housing activities are the
stipulated reserve requirements of the Ministry of Finance36 . These reserve requirements,
or MOF targets as they are called, are the amounts by which investments (specifically
short-term investments) should grow in order for the government to meet its liquidity
requirement. A major percentage of the Trust's cash inflows, therefore, goes into the
national budget as a kind of indirect subsidy. According to the budget rules, the NHT is
required to invest a large part of its income in short-term, usually revolving, securities.
36 Klak, T., 1995, "Obstacle to Low-Income Housing Assistance in a Capitalist Periphery: The Case of Jamaica".
The MOF targets are related to cash inflows and not to surplus income, so that whether or
not a surplus is made, these targets must be met. In other words, it is cash flow sources
such as contributions and investment income from which the MOF targets must be met.
Table 4.3 shows the minimum portion of income that must be kept in cash and short-term
deposits. Based on the price of J$356,727 in 1995 for a studio unit of 300 sq. ft., the
target of J$ 1,117.89 million for the 1995/1996 financial year, for instance, could finance
approximately 3,134 mortgages.
Table 4.3: Ministry of Finance Growth Targets for the years 1989/90-1995/1996
1989/90 203.5
1990/91 76.60
1991/92 253.90
1992/93 264.09
1993/94 630.0
1994/95 1,030.0
1995/96 1,117.89
Source: The Finance Division, NHT
It is obvious that some government policies are irrelevant to the cause of improving the
housing conditions of the target population if they restrict the amount of resources which
flow into the housing sector (Klak,1995). But there is also some substance to the
argument that the NHT be regulated because some of its activities distort the financial
market, at least to the extent that higher income groups take advantage of NHT's cheap
funds rather than going on the open market. The precise impact of this ought to be
analyzed and quantified, but must be separated from the issue of targeting low-income
groups, particularly because these individuals would hardly be contributing to the
distortion since they are not borrowers on the open market.
4.1.1.2.2 NHT's Activities and Politics
It is no news that politics in Jamaica has been a major influencing agent of housing policy
and programs. Klak refers to this influence as regime ideology (Klak, 1995). This
concept constitutes the philosophy for the particular housing policy or program, and the
housing priorities of the administration in power. But though regime influence is
important, Klak has maintained that its influence has weakened over the years; the
neoliberal approach to development has taken over. The National Housing Trust is a
product of the Michael Manley socialist agenda of the 1970s. As such, much of its
objectives and activities, at least its earlier activities, have been shaped by its origin.
Today however, the social objectives of the Trust takes second place to its more mortgage
banking activities and orientation. This may be due to the fact that the job of becoming
an efficient mortgage bank is more straight forward, therefore, more easily achieved that
finding solutions for the low-income contributors.
As supported by the literature, one of the ways to determine regime influence is to study
the policies implemented under each regime of the PNP and the JLP, and the extent to
which these policies prioritize low-income persons. The premise behind this method is
that the PNP has a more socialist orientation, and therefore, during its administration, one
would expect to find more of its housing policies to be low-income inclined, with more
low-income persons benefiting. While on the other hand, with the JLP having a more
free market orientation, one would expect to find more higher income persons being
beneficiaries. Klak used a three-step calculation to measure the regime effect from
NHT's data. These included, looking at the proportion of contributors at each income
level receiving mortgages; making a comparison between each income level's
contribution to the housing fund and the value of its housing loans; and finally,
combining these two methods to produce a measure that account for both the loan
probability, and the financial flow both in and out of each income level under each
administration.
As seen in the information presented in chapter 3, during the 70s, period of the PNP's
administration, mean and median income of mortgagors were lower than those of the
1980's, during the JLP's reign. As supported by Klak's analysis, the probability of a
getting a loan was greater for those persons in the 6th and the 7th income decile during
the 70's. Klak's findings corroborated well with the information presented in the
preceding chapter. Under Seaga's regime, NHT's lending favored those contributors of
higher income brackets (See Figure 3.4 on pg. 65).
Overall, both groups have not target most of the housing benefits to the lowest-income
groups. This may support the claim, that "the forces that redirect socially progressive
policies of the NHT toward a more market-oriented behavior transcends the regime in
power" (Klak, 1995). Nevertheless, all research on housing activities in Jamaica, do
support the fact that the PNP regime is the one that makes a much greater contribution in
provision of housing solution for the target population. Not only are the number of loans
greater under the PNP regime, but more low-income initiatives are tried by this
administration. The more recent ones are the promotion of the NHT's BOL and house lot
loan programs, and the introduction of the 2% interest rates for low-income contributors.
The Trust has also been trying in recent times to bring in more self-employed
contributors. But given the present structural adjustment policies of the government, the
problem of high inflation and continuing increases in construction and land costs, and the
foreign exchange shortages, the social agenda for the Trust may be forced to take a back
seat.
5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
5.1 NHT Missing its Target(s)?
The NHT is making an invaluable contribution to the housing sector, both in terms of
increasing the housing stock and also in providing mortgage financing. The Trust is the
largest mobilizer of funds for housing and the single largest entity contributing to the
provision of housing for the working poor. The Trust over the years has: added to the
housing stock, though not to the extent that was envisioned upon its creation; provided
some flow of funds to the building industry, through its interim financing activities, and
construction activities; increased the assets of the organization, and maintained a strong
financial position in the housing industry; provided mortgages to some of its contributors,
but the extent to which these mortgages were provided equitably has been the focus of
thesis.
My research shows that the Trust has fallen short of the objective of delivering more of
its benefits to those with the greatest need. The majority of NHT loans have not gone to
individuals earning the minimum income. There has also not been much redistribution or
cross-subsidization among mortgagors. This section of the thesis will summarize some of
the main causes for this imbalance, and will conclude with some recommendations for the
future of the Trust.
Causes for the NHT falling short of its targets can be grouped as those from external
sources, and those originating from the NHT itself. We see that, for instance, some
government policies which at times cannot be distinguished from the party politics, have
had some negative impact on the Trust's operations - reduction in total output. The
reserve requirement policy of the government has reduced the amount of funds going into
housing investments. The data also showed that the Trust's total output is to a certain
extent influenced by the 'political party in power'. More mortgages were made,
particularly to lower income contributors during the PNP's administration. The macro-
economic environment in which the Trust operates also influences its achievements. The
country's high levels of inflation have pushed up the prices of housing solutions, and with
reduced value of real wages, have made benefits unaffordable particularly to the low-
income contributors.
The Trust's own operations over the years have also contributed to it missing its target(s).
There is some evidence to suggest that the Trust is not able to attract more of its low-
income contributors to apply for the benefits. In-depth analysis of this claim could not be
done because up until the last application intake in August 1995, the Trust has maintained
no complete record of information on its applicants. However, based on information
from this last intake process which was largely a low-income one, the number of low-
income contributors who applied to the Trust was less than 50%. Several factors can be
attributed to this. Since the Trust does not advertise a maximum qualifying income for
their units, higher income applicants will also apply. One could speculate also that low-
income persons do not apply to the Trust because they do not meet all the eligibility
requirements - one quick disqualifier is not being employed - person has to be a current
contributor. Another possibility is that these persons cannot afford the cost of the units,
and/or the cost of a mortgage. Cuenco (1989) mentioned in her work that low-income
persons seem to have an aversion to long-term credit. Another possibility is lack of
information about the available types of loan. Research done by the Trust's research unit
has consistently demonstrated that the majority of individuals that have been interviewed
in surveys know very little about the different loans offered by the Trust.
Another major handicap to NHT's operations is inaccuracy and inconsistency in its data
bases. For instance, to date it has no accurate figure for its total contributors. The
Trust's three main data bases: its Contributor File, Mortgage Master, and the Benefit
Master, a file on the Trust selectees are all not accurate, primarily because of data entry
errors, inactive files, and out of date information - the files reflect less than the correct
number of records. The shortcomings of inaccurate data are obvious.
5.2 The Future for Housing Finance in Jamaica and the NHT
Recommendations are made for the improvement of the housing finance system in
Jamaica in general, and the NHT in particular. This section incorporates some of the
solutions offered by the literature to the problems of housing finance in developing
countries.
5.2.1 Prospects for NHT's Contributors
Any discussion about the prospects of the Trust's contributors centers around the major
issue of whether the Trust's primary mandate is a social one, and therefore, whether the
Trust's activities should be realigned to its low-income contributors. Based on the
analysis of NHT's operations, it is my observation that the Trust, whether consciously or
subconsciously, is struggling to with two main objectives: providing more benefits for its
low-income contributors; and increasing and maintaining its business volume with the
intention of becoming a strong mortgage financing institution.
Given the present political and economic conditions of Jamaica, the question is whether
the Trust can pursue the two paths concurrently? or whether the Trust should give up
totally, the commitment to providing housing for low-income persons and concentrate on
becoming an efficient mortgage bank? and asked another way - whether the Trust is really
in a position to do more for its low-income contributors?
The remainder of this section summarizes the Trust's present corporate objectives and
ends with recommendations for specific strategies to increase the benefits to low-income
contributors.
5.2.1.1 Strategic Planning for Efficient Mortgage Financing- The Trust's Present
Focus
The primary focus of the organization, at least in the past few years, is a move towards
becoming a more banking-type, housing finance institution. The Trust first major move
in this direction was the establishment of a Corporate Planning unit, in 1994. The unit's
main responsibility is to develop strategic and operational plans for the organization.
Such plans are to give the NHT a strong competitive edge in the financial arena. The unit
is to, among other things, analyze the options and alternatives of the Trust to enable it to
respond quickly to new business opportunities on the financial market; help to streamline
the development of new products and services; use funds more efficiently; raise capital on
the capital market, etc.
For the first time in its history, the Senior Executive Management Team of the NHT
developed a three-year strategic plan - April 1995 - March 1998. The plan focused on six
areas of needs, ranging from customer service to staff morale. Out of these areas of
needs, the executive management felt that the following areas of competencies needed to
be developed:
* Improvement in the design and delivery of the needs of all contributors;
" The continuous improvement of the mortgage delivery system;
" The development and maintenance of an efficient contributions collection system;
" The provision of a first class information system.
The Trust is now in the process of re-engineering its entire operations. One of the
immediate areas of focus is its information service department. Efforts will be made to
update the department's application system, making the it more integrated, and improving
its on-line communication and processing capacity.
The Trust's strategic objectives, at least on paper, seem not to be at dissonance with the
objectives of increasing services to its low-income contributors. It is necessary that the
financial integrity and management capacity of the Trust be improved so that it will be
able to serve its clientele well. But as operations get larger, and the pressure to stay
competitive on the financial market increases, there is the danger that the more social
objectives of the Trust could be derailed. To be successful in extending benefits to more
of its low-income contributors in particular, has to be a firm commitment.
5.2.1.2 A Commitment to Providing Low-income Housing - A Look to the Future
NHT's present mortgage credit system could be viewed as socially unfair, since some
low-income earners are forcibly contributing to this Trust fund, but are not benefiting. If
this premise is accepted then, it becomes even a moral obligation of the Trust to find
ways to make its credit system more aligned to the needs of its low-income contributors.
Some of the possible strategies that could be employed are summarized as follows:
e A commitment to finding appropriate housing solutions for the Trust's low-income
clientele should start with the establishment of a separate division whose only
responsibility is to research, organize, implement, and monitor new products and
services for low-income contributors. This division should work closely with the
public education, the community services, and research departments to investigate
appropriate ways in which the Trust's low-income contributors can be reached, both
in terms of increasing their contributions, and making them aware of available
benefits. The data of the last application intake period hinted that low-income
contributors are not among the majority of applicants. The unit's responsibility could
also include periodic review of the Trust mortgage portfolio to ensure that there is
equity in the spread of benefits to the target population.
The idea of having a separate department is related to the fact that the job of
managing the affairs of the low-income contributors is not a simple task, and a full-
time and complete commitment is necessary. The task is not easy, primarily because
of the constantly changing situation of the low-income contributors. It is important
that needs of this group be studied carefully in order to derive the most appropriate
strategies. The Trust may learn a lot from organizations like the NGOs, who work
directly with many low-income groups, or finance organizations such as the Credit
Unions who lend to them. Accordingly, a more efficient approach might be a
collaborative one.
e The Trust could establish a grant, or a small fund specifically for low-income joint-
venture type activities with community organizations. This money could be indexed
to inflation so that the value is maintained. This sum could be given (lent) to eligible
organizations such as NGOs or other established community based organizations
involved in the provision of low-income income. The NHT periodically makes
monetary donations to some NGO activities in the Kingston Metropolitan area, and
this practiced could be extended. Community based institutions may be the best
candidates for such programs, primarily because most their clientele are low-income
families. Some NGOs are already involved in community housing initiatives.
e The NHT has implemented new strategies - group credits and its 2% interest rates for
the lowest-income contributors, but it will have to do more in supporting
unconventional activities such as site and services and/or settlement upgrading
schemes. The Trust must also push the development of its house lot program even
further. In urban areas where land is expensive, the Trust should invest in inner city
developments, whether through government programs or private groups, to include
NGOs or CBOs. Residents in squatter communities seem to build according to their
ability to pay. The Trust programs should incorporate this phenomenon in the design
of loan programs for low-income contributors.
There are, therefore, some points that are critical to the viability of this program
include:
- The loans must be suitable for low-income households - small
loans amounts, and short maturities;
- Loan originators should be institutions which low-income
individuals will approach. Hence the emphasis on community
based organizations;
- The loan transaction(application, processing, etc.) must be kept as
simple as possible;
- Funds from the program could be channeled through the
commercial banks (The Workers Bank), and/or Credit Union, to
help to integrate the program within the national financial system.
This system could easily be extended to owners of rental properties.
e The Trust mortgage credit system has encouraged a tenure bias. As the literature
points out, the possibilities of housing and land tenure arrangements are as varied as
the needs of the this group of individuals at different stages of their life cycle and
economic circumstances. For instance, renting is popular among low-income persons,
and this tenure arrangement may even be preferred and more affordable, given the
financial situation of this group (McCullum, Douglas and Benjamin, 1985). The
Trust is weary of embarking on any rental program, because of the potentially heavy
administrative cost involved. But the Trust could be involved in such a program, if
indirectly. One form of involvement is through a special loan program for landlords,
to entice them into renovating their properties and keeping them in rentals. However,
there would have to be some stipulation in the program that guarantees landlords will
charge 'reasonable' rents. The success of this program would hinge on a functioning
Rent Act.
The affordability levels of low-income contributors necessitate that the Trust concentrate
on cheaper, smaller activities for this group. Making more benefits available to this
group may warrant a collaborative strategy, between the Trust, its low-income
contributors, and other organizations. Perhaps the best role of the NHT is that of a
facilitator, relying more on the initiative of its contributors (Turner, 1978, 1976, 1972 and
Peattie, 1981, 1980, 1979).
5.3 Implications for Policy and Administrative Reform
The lessons from the literature suggest a holistic approach to the problem of housing
finance in developing countries. No serious attempt at solving the problems can be made
without considering the housing policy in total (Okpala, 1994; Renaud, 1984). In turn,
the development of a good housing policy must form part of an overall reform of the
financial and economic sectors. The promotion of savings, and the free movement of
capital through the housing sector must be encouraged. If these principles are accepted,
then any housing activity that distorts the proper functioning of the financial and
economic processes, must be reviewed.
Some proponents support non-government intervention (World Bank, 1987) allowing,
therefore, the market forces to freely allocate housing resources. We have seen where the
allocation of housing by the market does not guarantee that those most in need will be the
ones to get it. The failed attempts of the many liberalization policies, tried at some point
by many developing countries, attest to the fact that appropriate supervisory mechanisms
for the finance system are necessary (Rakoodi,1995). Therefore, the appropriate question
at this point is where and how should government intervene. There is agreement that
given the limited resources of some low-income workers, government intervention
through some form of subsidy may be necessary. The disagreement comes in the type of
subsidy that is appropriate. Interest rates subsidies are said to distort the efficient
operation of the financial sector (Klak and Peterson, 1990; Malpezzi, 1990; Renaud,
1987; Mayo, 1986). Income subsidies are the ones favored, particularly because they
create less distortion. However, in the context of Jamaica's politics, and administrative
structure, it is unrealistic to assume the use of income subsidies are achievable in the near
future. Therefore, interest rate subsidies though not a solution, must be considered an
alternative - at least in the short-run.
Perhaps a realistic strategy is a policy mix between government activities and private
sector. Government's main responsibility may be that of a facilitator, facilitating for
instance, the flow of capital into the housing sector; providing land and infrastructure;
and providing low-income persons with opportunities to provide their own shelter. There
is also the need to for some institutional streamlining and restructuring among housing
institutions. But, whatever the role, there can be no substitute for a sound macro-
economic policy (Malpezzi, 1990; Grimes, 1976). In an unstable economic environment,
housing usually bears the brunt of it. In a housing shortage, it is the low-income groups
that are at the greatest disadvantage. The review of the limitations of strategies tried thus
far, also suggest that imported models and instruments, particularly those which are
incompatible with the local and social environment may only serve to exacerbate the
problems.
The NHT is poised as the organization most able to help the poor working class find
suitable housing solutions. The present corporate objectives are a step in the right
direction. But there are necessary changes in the Trust's operations that must be
addressed. One of the first task at hand is the rationalization of its credit subsidy system.
The present system is not very 'transparent'. As the analyses show it is not always clear
who is subsidizing whom. Part of the rationalization process could include increasing the
interest rates charged on loans to higher income groups. Loan amounts going to this
group over a certain amount should also be indexed to inflation, which suggests that new
mortgage instruments should be developed. The low interest rates charged on loans to
low-income contributors can be continued without risking profitability, particularly
because its cost of funds is so low. The Trust should also consider increasing the interest
paid on contribution refunds, or discontinue these refunds and replace them with a
savings instrument. This would not only increase the flow of resources to the Trust, but a
contributor could also used it for defraying some of costs of the loan, from the Trust or
from another finance institution. This may encourage more persons to contribute. This,
however, will require an amendment of the act. The sourcing of capital on the financial
market through the selling of bonds to other financial institutions should be considered.
But even before any rationalization the mortgage credit system is attempted, the Trust's
must first address the problems of its data bases. The NHT's data bases are very
important because they are records of housing loan repayment; these data contain
information about households that have obtained loans from the Trust, and about the
loans themselves. They are, important because they describe both the source and end-
point of the agency's flow of funds. With inaccurate accounting data bases, it becomes
very difficult to, for example, keep track of the organization's business. As the analyses
have shown, inaccurate data such as negative loan amounts make it difficult to quantify
the total subsidy per mortgagor, an important component of the NHT's program.
If these necessary institutional reforms are undertaken, and with autonomy over the use of
its housing resources the Trust could do more for its low-income contributors. This task
may not be as straightforward as becoming an efficient mortgage bank, but it is
achievable.
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APPENDIX 1
SPECIAL ASPECTS OF THE HOUSING PROBLEM
Population Characteristics and Trend
To understand the gravity of the housing problem, some understanding of the dynamics
urbanization in Jamaica is necessary. Over the past two intercensal periods, the island
has experienced an annual rate of growth of 86%. According to the 1991 census, the total
population was estimated to be 2.4 million people. This represented a net increment of
approximately 175,710 persons since the 1980 census, a percentage change of 8.02%. The
census data have also indicated that more than half of population lived in towns and
cities in 1991.
Table 1: Urban Growth in Jamaica 1970-1991
KMA 506.2 524.6 58.1 0.85 0.28
Portmore 0.5 73.4 90.1 25.0 2.30
Over 15,000
Montego Bay 43.5 70.3 83.4 4.10 1.92
Spanish Town 39.2 89.1 92.6 5.70 0.40
May Pen 25.4 41.0 46.7 4.10 1.49
Mandeville 13.7 34.5 39.4 8.00 1.49
Old Harbor 9.5 18.5 20.8 6.70 1.23
St. Ann's Bay 13.0 16.8 19.3 2.20 1.49
Savanna-La-Mar 11.9 14.9 16.6 1.77 1.10
Centers 5 - 15,000 69.9 117.7 140.0 4.90 1.90
Under 5,000 28.7 46.2 37.0 4.40 -1.90
Total Urban 761.5 1047.0 1124.0 2.70 1.20
Rural 1086.9 1143.4 1124.2 .40 0.16
TOTAL JAMAICA 18484 2190.4 2248.2 1.42 0.61
Source: Statistical Institute of Jamaica (SATIN) Census Data
Attitudes Towards Shelter
The dream home for many Jamaicans is a complete, a unit of multiple rooms, made of
block and steel with a yard. This dream is no different for low-income persons. But
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faced with their reality, they make do with what is affordable. For instance, in tenements,
tenants will make repairs to their houses, in an attempt to make them different. For
tenants, especially where there is some security of tenure, their home is still there focus of
pride and identity.
Squatters, even in their situation still aspire to own their own home. They too, perceive
their dream home to be a complete house (A survey of a Squatter Community in Flankers,
Jamaica). The greatest demonstration of self-help is seen in these squatter communities.
It is always maintain that, given security of tenure, squatters will begin to improve their
homes and make them more permanent. But current literature extends this view by
suggesting that the actual commodity itself is more relevant than the security of tenure,
since even with this security, access to credit is still limited by the low incomes.
Housing is also a priority for the rural poor and this group also hold the same aspirations.
For the most part, rural folks, particularly small farmers usually build their own houses to
minimize costs. They often build small wooden structures and add to them incrementally
as funds become available. Rural folks are not particularly interested in borrowing
money to build. The "fear of 'losing their land titles', with failure to repay their loans,
income inadequacy and instability are the primary reasons for avoiding credit" (The NHT
Research Unit Housing Demand Surveys).
A house provides a sense of security and identity for family. Homes are a source of pride
to their occupants. But despite the fact that low-income individuals aspire to more,
homes of block and steel and yard, there are still many strengths in the existing
communities. The ties of kin and friendship are important in low-income communities
and should be preserved when possible. The social function of the yard is valuable and is
a situation one should work within rather than destroy.
There are two striking characteristics of the low-income population that are especially
evident in low-income communities, - their adaptability and proficiency at self-help. For
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example, in situation of over-crowding and lack of facilities, people have learned to
share. For some, given the instability of their incomes and poverty, squatting has
provided an alternative. Although block and steel are preferred, some adopt to wood.
Because of the aversion to borrow money, some will build themselves.
The housing stock
Number of Rooms
A significantly larger proportion. 28.6% of households occupied one-room dwellings. An
overall 53.2 % occupied between one- or two-bedroom dwellings. For the KMA the
figures were bigger. Approximately 33% occupied one-room dwellings, with 57%
occupying one- or two-bedroom dwellings.
Table 2: Distribution of Housing Stock by Number of Rooms and Households
P Id
1 33.2 28.6
2 23.8 53.2
3 18.0 22.0
4 and over 24.6 24.1
Type of units
The vast majority of dwelling units in Jamaica (87%) are single-family detached houses,
fewer than 6% are units in apartment buildings. Apartments buildings and townhouses
are more prevalent in urban areas. For instance, the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA)
accounted for 54% of these units.
The prevalence of apartment type structures in the KMA is not unusual, since higher
densities are substituted for land, because of its scarcity. Spatially, therefore, all parishes
except the urban areas, and to a lesser extent, Kingston and St. Catherine had at least 80%
of households occupying separate detached dwelling units.
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The distribution in the type of housing unit was almost the same for the two censal years.
In 1991, as in 1982, the majority of households lived in separate detached dwellings, 86%
compared to 87% in 1991. Based on data from housing demand surveys, conducted by
the Research Department of the NHT, the preferred housing type is a detached unit with
land space.
Tenure
More than half of all households, 58% own the dwellings they live in while a less than a
third rent from private landlord. Ten percent of occupants live rent-free. According to
the census data, indicated only 1% of households as squatters.
There has been some improvement in the level of homeownership between the two censal
periods, 1982 and 1991. Homeownership has increased by 9% over the intercensal
periods. In 1991, 58% of all dwellings were owned compared to 47% in 1982. But
rentals have only increased marginally, 1%, between 1982 and 1991. The changes in
leased and rent-free dwellings were also marginal.
Quality of the Housing Stock
The vast majority of dwelling units are constructed of concrete, stone and brick. Most
were built before 1970, although the housing stock in other urban centers includes a large
number of units built during the 1970's. Nog and wattle and duab houses represent only a
small share of the total housing stock, particularly newer units in the case of urban
centers. Most wattle and daub houses are found in rural areas and were built before 1960.
The majority of recently built housing units are made of concrete, stone or brick, with a
significant minority constructed of wood.
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Growth of the Housing Stock
By June 1991, the total occupied housing stock was over 591,710, a 14% increase over
the 1982 figure of 508,710. The occupation density averaged over 4 persons per
dwelling. During the intercensal period 1970 to 1982, the occupied housing stock had
grown faster than the population at an annual rate of 0.96% compared with a 0.61%. This
resulted in an average occupancy rate of 4.23, decreasing from 4.33 in 1982.
Based on the census definition of a household, which is 'a group of people who share
accommodation and who generally eat together', most dwelling (98% in urban areas and
99% in rural areas) are occupied by only one households. However, these households
tend to be large; the average size of a household for the country as a whole is 3.9 persons.
In the KMA, the average household size is 3.8 persons, but approximately 9% have
households of over seven persons.
A large percentage of households, 37.3% are headed by females. The KMA topped that
figure with a percentage of 44.7%.
Amenities
In the KMA, almost 70% of households enjoyed piped water to at least their yard,
compared to 53% of the island's total. In rural parishes, the public standpipe was the
popular source. Spring and river were also sources for domestic water. There were some
parishes though, where a large percentage of households were using untreated water. For
instance, according to the census, in parishes like St. Mary, St. Ann, Trelawny,
Westmoreland, St. Elizabeth and Manchester, less than 70% of dwellings had potable
water for domestic use.
Population in parishes with untreated water become highly susceptible to especially water
borne diseases. In 1990, there was a serious typhoid outbreak in the parish of
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Westmoreland because individuals relied on contaminated streams for domestic water.
The need, therefore, for households to have access to potable water is very obvious.
In terms of toilet facilities, again the KMA the majority of households some form of
sanitary facilities. But while less than 10% have pit latrines, the main sewerage facilities
were not central systems. Even in the metropolitan areas of Kingston and St. Andrew,
and to a lesser extent, St. Catherine, central sewerage facilities were available to only
about 39% of households. In high densities of Kingston and St. Andrew, the census
indicate that as much as 42% of households had their own soak-away systems.
In the rural areas, pit-latrines were the more common means of solid waste disposal. This
is not surprising since flush-toilets require access to water supply to the house, which is in
most cases, not available. Though the occurrence of pit-latrines, or soakaways may be
environmentally safe in some areas, it may be a source of ground water contamination in
other areas.
Development Components and Costs
Perhaps the main problem providing low-cost housing is that of keeping costs within
affordable limits. The level of efficiency has never been high enough to keep cost at a
minimum. Over the last few years the residential building sector performed rather
sluggishly. This has been attributed to a number of factors, the most important one being
the high cost of financing. During the period, commercial bank rates reached a peak of
67%. This caused uncertainty among investors, resulting in the delay of some projects.
These delays eventually translated in most cases to increase costs to consumers. In a
recent study that looked at the evolution of housing costs, delays in the building approval
process add significantly to increases in development costs (Whitter, 1989).
Another factor that directly impacted on construction costs was the escalation of prices of
building materials. During the period, 1993-1994, the prices of selected materials
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increased on an average by 41.2%. The prices of major construction materials cement,
lumber and steel, increased by 21.7%, 21.7%, and 0.5% respectively. The increase in
GCT rates in the latter part of 1993 as well as the exchange rate movements were largely
responsible for the price movements. The table below shows the movement in prices for
some selected unit types of the NHT. These prices are comparable to what obtains on the
open market.
Table 2.4: Construction Prices in NHT's Typical Housing Units 1993 - 1995
Studio 300 236,366 282,985 356,727 51
One-Bedroom 310 265,459 317,685 401,390 51
Two-Bedroom 577 385,492 458,826 615,262 60
Three-Bedroom 807 474,386 568,521 721,084 52
Source: The Technical Services Department - NHT
While it may be difficult to curtail the sliding dollar and contain inflation in the short run,
they are certain easier measures that the government could undertake in order to reduce
housing costs. One such measure is the reforming of the approval process to reduce the
chronic delays. As Whitter pointed out in his piece, also the need for a comprehensive
study of the direct and indirect tax burden on the industry. This he feels will enable the
authorities to examine ways of granting tax relief on construction, without over-all loss of
revenue to the government. There is also need to assess the likely impact of the GCT on
housing.
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APPENDIX 2
SOME FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE NHT
2a:STATISTICAL SUMMARY, 1986 - 1995 (In Current Dollars)
OPERATING INCOME
Total Operating Income 85,479 105,584 149,385 182,504 230,732 324,247 374,830 536,763 801,134 1,268,628
Total Expense 7 9448,634 41,954 59,161 46,371 87,543 106,809 184,844 218,991 355,452 492,911
Net Operating Income (Surplus) 36,845 63,630 90,224 136,133 143,189 217,438 189,986 317,772 445,682 775,717
TOTAL ASSETS 936,434 1,152,233 1,425,622 1,720,200 2,115,395 2,604,346 3,322,849 4,402,563 6,220,436 8,863,819
% Change 23% 24% 21% 23% 23% 28% 32% 41% 42%
CONTRIBUTIONS 973,358 882,484 1,059,836 1,225,066 1,430,393 1,677,300 2,100,532 2,807,026 3,901,004 4,951,315
% Change -9% 20% 16% 17% 17% 25% 34% 39% 27%
Refundable Contributions 486,679 506,324 596,925 669,696 766,232 883,117 1,077,278 1,403,798 1,915,264 2,127,380
Non-refundable contributions 486,679 376,160 462,911 555,370 664,161 794,183 1,023,254 1,403,228 1,985,740 2,823,935
Contributions received for the year 80,296 109,457 158,546 169,306 206,127 247,034 423,883 707,636 1,108,791 1,580,963
Contribitions refunded for the year 7,950 12,879 12,082 11,484 8,968 9,976 11,219 13,272 28,368 11,210
HOUSING FINANCE 721,118 836,137 1,013,208 1,234,758 1,431,881 1,728,327 2,079,154 2,779,439 3,684,235 5,107,651
% Change 16% 21% 22% 16% 21% 20% 34% 33% 39%
Housing Construction 113,270 91,030 73,668 208,121 205,458 303,040 373,729 675,053 800,001 1,023,850
Mortgage Loans 607,848 745,107 939,540 1,026,637 1,226,423 1,425,287 1,705,425 2,104,386 2,884,234 4,083,801
Housing Finance as a percentage
Contributions 74% 95% 96% 101% 100% 103% 99% 99% 94% 103%
Mortgage loans as a percentage
of Contributions 62% 84% 89% 84% 86% 85% 81% 75% 74% 82%
Housing Finance as percentage
of Total Assets 77% 73% 71% 72% 68% 66% 63% 63% 59% 58%
Mortgage loans as percentage of
Total Assets 65% 65% 66% 60% 58% 55% 51% 48% 46% 46%
Housing Construction as a
Percentage of Total Assets 12% 8% 5% 12% 10% 12% 11% 15% 13% 12%
NUMBER OF LOANS IN
MORTGAGE PORTFOLIO 19,221 21,202 23,665 24,662 27,231 29,031 31,774 35,044 38,334 42,201
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2b: STATISTICAL SUMMARY, 1986 - 1995 (In 1976 Dollars)
Total Operating Income 13,911 15,852 20,595 21,468 20,910 16,307 13,445 14,799 17,434 22,741
Total Expense 7,915 6,299 8,156 5,455 7,933 5,372 6,630 6,038 7,735 8,836
Net Operating Income (Surplus) 5,996 9,553 12,438 16,013 12,976 10,935 6,815 8,762 9,699 13,905
TOTAL ASSETS 152,398 172,987 196,539 202,347 191,705 130,975 119,193 121,386 135,365 158,887
% Change 14% 14% 3% -5% -32% -9% 2% 12% 17%
CONTRIBUTIONS 158,407 132,489 146,111 144,104 129,628 84,353 75,348 77,394 84,891 88,754
-16% 10% -1% -10% -35% -11% 3% 10% 5%
Refundable Contributions 79,204 76,015 82,293 78,776 69,439 44,413 38,643 38,705 41,679 38,134
Non-refundable contributions 79,204 56,474 63,818 65,328 60,189 39,940 36,705 38,689 43,212 50,620
Contributions received for the year 13,068 16,433 21,858 19,915 18,680 12,424 15,205 19,511 24,129 28,339
Contribitions refunded for the year 1,294 1,934 1,666 1,351 813 502 402 366 617 201
HOUSING FINANCE 117,357 125,531 139,683 145,244 129,763 86,919 74,581 76,634 80,174 91,556
% Change 7% 11% 4% -11% -33% -14% 3% 5% 14%
Housing Construction 18,434 13,667 10,156 24,481 18,619 15,240 13,406 18,612 17,409 18,353
Mortgage Loans 98,923 111,864 129,527 120,763 111,143 71,679 61,175 58,021 62,765 73,204
Housing Finance as a percentage
Contributions 74% 95% 96% 101% 100% 103% 99% 99% 94% 103%
Mortgage loans as a percentage
of Contributions 62% 84% 89% 84% 86% 85% 81% 75% 74% 82%
Housing Finance as percentage
of Total Assets 77% 73% 71% 72% 68% 66% 63% 63% 59% 58%
Mortgage loans as percentage of
Total Assets 65% 65% 66% 60% 58% 55% 51% 48% 46% 46%
Housing Construction as a
Percentage of Total Assets 12% 8% 5% 12% 10% 12% 11% 15% 13% 12%
NUMBER OF LOANS IN
MORTGAGE PORTFOLIO 3,128 3,183 3,263 2,901 2,468 1,460 3,177 966 834 756
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2c: NHT ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, 1986 - 1996, (In Current Dollars)
---- -- - - - -.. - -.... ....... .... ---------
-Short-term assets 103,618 188,245 258,676 322,882 456,512 592,615 809,770 813,999 1,478,499 2,253,701
- Long-term investments 57,121 56,758 54,450 52,713 49,330 31,743 108,739 434,998 448,327 505,065
Deffered Expenditure 5,353 11,541 23,939 27,375 22,312
Fixed Assets 20,933 19,151 17,775 15,873 15,464 31,121 36,878 53,416 83,521 372,831
- M - --- - - -- -o
0.23 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.28 0.32 0.41 0.42 (1.00)
LIABILITIES
Bonus to Employees Not Yet Due
Provision for Unremitted Employees Contributions
Long-Term Liabilities
Unclaimed Cash Grants
Deferred Income
Refundable Contributions Not Yet Due
21,789
3,456
27,929
25,691
359,290
24,282
3,456
85,445
24,701
394,413
28,942
3,456
30,957
84,800
35,515
430,457
31,444
3,456
25,483
110,900
35,466
468,313
36,428
3,456
47,151
144,270
40,913
524,493
41,476
3,456
61,876
175,369
43,991
590,352
49,026
3,456
128,079
234,991
48,528
731,828
61,203
3,456
104,736
289,337
59,690
997,057
82,951
3,456
133,527
328,807
73,602
1,453,060
120,281
3,456
125,644
380,475
123,789
2,127,380
Accumulated Fund 1 387,460| 522,5701 699,5451 928,13711180,1171 1,527,5771 1,946,6341 2,644,3811 3,672,5741 5,511,042
111
2d: NHT ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, 1986 - 1996, (In 1976 Dollars)
ASSETS
-Short-term investments 16,863 28,262 35,662 37,981 41,371 29,803 29,047 22,443 32,174 40,398
- Long-term Investments 9,296 8,521 7,507 6,201 4,470 1,596 3,901 11,994 9,756 9,053
Defered Expenditure 269 414 660 596 400
Fixed Assets 3,407 2,875 2,451 1,867 1,401 1,565 1,323 1,473 1,818 6,683
0.13 0.14 0.03 (0.05) (0.32) (0.09) 0.02 0.12 0.17 (1.00)
LIABILITIES
Bonus to Employees Not Yet Due 3,546 3,646 3,990 3,699 3,301 2,086 1,759 1,687 1,805 2,156
Provision for Unremitted Employees Contributions 562 519 476 407 313 174 124 95 75 62
Long-Term Liabilities 4,545 12,828 4,268 2,998 4,273 3,112 4,594 2,888 2,906 2,252
Unclaimed Cash Grants 0 0 11,691 13,045 13,074 8,819 84,296 7,978 7,155 6,820
Deferred Income 4,181 3,708 4,896 4,172 3,708 2,212 1,741 1,646 1,602 2,219
Refundable Contributions Not Yet Due 58,472 59,214 59,344 55,088 47,532 29,689 26,251 27,491 31,621 38,134
Accumulated Fund 63,056 78,454 96,441 109,177 106,947 76,823 69,827 72,910 79,920 98,787
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APPENDIX 3
THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF MORTGAGORS
3a. The Income Distribution of NHT's Mortgagors (Based on NHT's Income Bands)
< 1,101 1508(12)
1,100 - 2,000 2417(20)
2,001 - 3,000 1834(15)
3,001 - 4,000 803 ( 7)
4,001 -5,000 379 ( 3)
6,001 - 6,500 252 ( 2)
6,500+ 4940(41)
(41) Percentages of valid cases
3b. The Income Distribution of Applicants in the August 1995 Intake
< 1,101 1896(12)
1,100 - 2,000 4572 (29)
2,001 - 3,000 3405 (21)
3,001 - 4,000 2989 (19)
4,001 - 5,000 1366 (9)
6,001 - 6,500 895 ( 6)
6,500+ 693 ( 4)
(20) Percentages of valid cases
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